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Naval Aviation has been challenged to cut its 1996 human factors related Class A
flight mishap rate in half by the year 2000. Investigations show that human caused flight
mishaps have not declined as rapidly as mechanical ones. From fiscal year 1990 through
1997, maintenance was a causal factor in 17 percent of Class A flight mishaps. Presently,
there is an ongoing effort to identify factors contributing to human error in aviation
maintenance. One major component is the development of an instrument to assess safety
climate and posture in maintenance operations. This thesis is the climate safety
assessment portion of this effort. It utilizes and adapts an existing Model of
Organizational Safety Effectiveness (MOSE) to achieve an understanding of the possible
influences of organizational factors on aviation maintenance. This thesis develops and
administers a prototype Maintenance Climate Assessment Survey (MCAS) that provides
a tool for assessing safety in maintenance operations. The study has 268 participants
from three Reserve squadrons that represent the spectrum of aviation communities. The
prototype MCAS is comprised of 67 questions developed from 155 candidate questions.
Each question uses a Likert type rating scale, which allows participants to express
opinions for each item presented. Cluster and Factor analysis is used to identify
redundancies between items and how items clustered according to the MOSE
components. The product of this study is a finalized MCAS with 35 questions that can be
used by the Squadron command and Aviation Safety Officer to assess their unit's safety
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Naval Aviation has been challenged to cut its 1996 human factors related Class A
flight mishap rate in half by the year 2000. Numerous engineering and programmatic
intervention strategies have been put in place to reduce aviation mishaps, and
subsequently, the annual flight mishap rate. Improved aircraft reliability, advanced
cockpit technologies, upgrades to avionics, and new acquisitions have lead to
improvements that have helped to lower the mishap rate. However, mishaps are still
occurring. Investigations show that while the mechanical-caused flight mishap rate has
fallen significantly to an all time low, the human-caused flight mishap rate has not
declined as rapidly and has possibly increased in the last 10 years (Naval Safety Center,
1997).
On the heels of the 29 January 1996 Nashville, Tennessee, F-14 fighter jet mishap
that killed the aircrew and several local residents, Vice Admiral Bennitt, Commander
Naval Air Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, created a Human Factors Quality Management Board
(HFQMB) to improve aviation safety by preventing human error. The HFQMB was
chartered to examine factors contributing to human error, especially aircrew error.
In 1997, the Navy and Marine Corps had an impressive year; their combined class
A flight mishap rate was the second lowest ever recorded and it was the Navy's best ever
recorded (NSC, 1998). Given this success, a shift to improve maintenance was initiated.
Of all the identified causal factors that contributed to Class A flight mishaps from fiscal
year 1990 through 1997, 17 percent involved maintenance. "Maintenance" causal factors
are primarily due to human errors by maintenance personnel and/or maintenance
supervisors. The maintenance thrust of the HFQMB adapted the same approach of
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benchmarking, mishap data analysis, and climate safety assessment. This thesis is the
climate safety assessment portion of an ongoing study of Naval Aviation maintenance
operations.
Organizational culture has an effect on the entire organization. This is especially
true in high-risk organizations where potential outcomes of a system failure can be
catastrophic and costly. Naval Aviation is recognized as a high-risk organization, which
can experience devastation if something goes awry. This also holds true for aviation
maintenance as well as operations. This study involves the analysis of data from a
prototype survey that is based on an existing model of high-risk organizations. The
purpose of this study is to develop, administer, and validate a Maintenance Climate
Assessment Survey (MCAS) to assess the effectiveness of Naval Aviation maintenance
operations in the management of risk. It utilizes and adapts an existing Model of
Organizational Safety Effectiveness (MOSE). This study analyzes the MCAS data; the
results are intended to improve our understanding of the possible influences of human
factors in aviation maintenance related mishaps, and to provide a tool that can be used by
the Squadron command and Aviation Safety Officer to assess their unit's safety posture
in conducting scheduled / unscheduled maintenance operations.
The study includes a total of 268 participants, of whom 212 are maintainers, from
three Reserve squadrons that represent a variety of Naval Aviation communities. The
prototype MCAS comprised 67 questions developed from 155 candidate questions. Each
question contained five point Likert scales (strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, agree,
and strongly agree) which allowed participants to rate items according to their views.
The questions fit into six components of the MOSE: Process Auditing, Reward System
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and Safety Culture, Quality, Risk Management, Command and Control, and
Communication / Relationships. The data analysis entails descriptive statistics, cluster
analysis and factor analysis for objective identifications of redundancies among items and
how items clustered according to the MOSE components. Redundant questions are
eliminated and questions with common intent are combined. Some questions remain the
same. Thorough analysis of the questions produce a finalized MCAS with a total of 35
questions that can be used for individual squadron self-assessment of safety posture in




Naval Aviation is an inherently complicated system, from flying the platform into a
hostile environment to landing it on an aircraft carrier. Complex systems have many
forces acting on them, some synergistically, some separately, all having either positive or
negative effects (Perrow, 1986). Such forces and the effects they have on the system are
difficult to grasp and understand (Bond, Byran, Rigney, & Warren, 1975). These forces
can lead to pilot errors, cause failures in the platform or create a range of causal factors
that can lead to the loss of a platform, or worse, lives, thus having a direct effect on
combat readiness. Warfighting readiness and victory in combat can be achieved by
keeping the platforms functional and the pilots alive (Nutwell & Sherman, 1997).
A. BACKGROUND
The Naval Aviation Safety Program (Chief of Naval Operations Instruction
3750.6Q, 1989) was established to deal with aviation mishaps and any related causal
factors. The purpose of this program is to preserve human and material resources while
its objective is to eliminate hazards, the causes of damage and injury. In essence, the
program was set up to determine all hazards that can become causal factors leading to
aviation mishaps.
Numerous efforts have been employed in attempts to lower the Class A flight
mishap rate (Figure 1). These efforts resulted in the creation of several institutions and
programs, including the Naval Aviation Safety Center (now Naval Safety Center - NSC),
the Naval Aviation Maintenance Program (NAMP), the Fleet Replacement Squadron
(FRS) concept, the Naval Air Training & Operating Procedures & Standards (NATOPS),
1
and the Squadron Safety Program (SSP). Additional efforts include Aircrew Coordination
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Figure 1. FY 50-96 Flight Mishap Rates and Intervention Strategies.
From "Naval Safety Center Brief," by Admiral F. Dirren, April 1997.
All of the above efforts are intervention strategies put in place to reduce aviation
mishaps and the annual flight mishap rate. The first five programs mentioned are design
and programmatic in type. The last three break from an engineering and management
focus to concentrate more on human factors issues. Improved aircraft reliability,
advanced cockpit technologies, upgrades to avionics, and new acquisitions have lead to
improvements that lower the mishap rate. However, mishaps are still occurring. Since
1990, approximately 4 of every 5 Department of the Navy (DON) Class A flight mishaps
(those involving aircraft damage in excess of one million dollars or fatal injury) involve
human factors (Department of the Navy (DON), 1997). For example, in 1997, of the 27
aircraft destroyed, 23 involved human factors.
Naval Aviation has been challenged to cut its 1996 human factor related Class A
flight mishap rate in half by the year 2000. To do this, it must systematically and
continuously improve all of the processes, programs, and systems affecting the safety of
Naval Aviation operations (Nutwell & Sherman, 1997). The Naval Aviation Class A
flight mishap rate has been significantly reduced over the past few decades. However, it
appears to have reached a plateau over the past decade as indicated in Figure 2.
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Figure 2. Naval Aviation Class A Flight Mishap Trend FY 88-97.
Rate is Defined as the Number of Class A, B, & C Flight Mishaps Per 100,000 Flight Hours.
Though the Navy and Marine Corps flight mishap rate has generally decreased
over the past two decades, the rate of decline has slowed. Investigations show that while
the mechanical-caused flight mishap rate has fallen significantly to an all time low, the
human-caused flight mishap rate has not declined as rapidly and is possibly leveling off
or even increasing in recent years (NSC, 1997). Some conclude that this split is due to
the complexity of the aircraft and current pressures of operations tempo, personnel
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Figure 3. Mechanical/Catastrophic Failures vs Human Errors Over All Mishaps.
From "Naval Safety Center Brief," by Admiral F. Dirren, April 1997.
Figure 4 shows the percentage of determined causal factors that contributed to
Class A flight mishaps from FY90 - FY97. Supervisory factors were present in 62
percent of these flight mishaps. Examples of supervisory factors include inadequate
command supervision of flight operations or safety, failures to correctly assess mission
risks, and the inappropriate handling of a known high-risk situation. The aircrew was
found to be a causal factor in 56 percent of the mishaps. Material factors, defined as
material failure of the component, were present in 39 percent of the mishaps.
Maintenance was found to be a causal factor in 17 percent of mishaps. This
"maintenance" causal factor was primarily due to human errors by maintenance personnel
or maintenance supervisors. Facilities factors, relating to human errors in conjunction
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Figure 4. Navy and Marine Corps Fiscal Year 90-96 Class A Flight Mishap Causal Factors.
From "Naval Safety Center Brief," by Admiral F. Dirren, April 1997.
On the heels of the 29 January 1996 Nashville, Tennessee, F-14 fighter jet mishap
that killed the aircrew and several local residents, Vice Admiral Bennitt, Commander
Naval Air Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, created a Human Factors Quality Management Board
(HFQMB) to improve aviation safety by preventing human error. The charter of the
HFQMB is to analyze and improve each of the processes, programs, and systems that
impact human performance in aviation with the purpose of dramatically reducing the
annual flight mishap rate (DON, 1997). In other words, its main objective is to analyze
human factors involvement in past Naval Aviation mishaps and in present Naval Aviation
operations. Preventing a mishap contributes to readiness and mission success by keeping
people and airplanes available through controlling safety-related hazards. Most of the
HFQMB initiatives directly contribute to mission readiness, as well as indirectly, through
mishap prevention (Nutwell & Sherman, 1997).
Three processes define the HFQMB methodology: Benchmarking, Mishap Data-
Analysis (MDA), and Command Safety Assessment (CSA). These lead to brainstorming
and potential intervention strategies, which in turn result in recommendations presented
to the Navy's Air Board of Flag officers (Figure 5). Benchmarking occurred with visits
to commercial airlines, private industry, sister services, NASA, the FAA, NATO partners,
and academia. The objective was to examine the culture, training, safety, and leadership
of each organization; to identify and learn about successful safety practices in order to
adopt best practices, identify lessons learned, and avoid "re-inventing the wheel."
Figure 5. HFQMB Methodology.
From "AIRPAC Brief," by CDR J. Schmidt, March 1998.
The MDA categorizes the human error elements of a mishap into three groups:
unsafe supervisory conditions, unsafe aircrew conditions, and unsafe aircrew acts. The
first two are seen as latent conditions and the last as active failures. Unsafe supervisory
conditions include planned inappropriate operations, failure to correct known problems,
supervisory violations, and inadequate supervision. Unsafe aircrew conditions pertain to
aeromedical, personnel readiness and cockpit resource management (CRM) problems.
Unsafe aircrew acts pertain to slips, lapses, mistakes, routine violations, and exceptional
acts of the aircrew. Class A flight mishap data analysis from fiscal year 1990 through
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1996 showed the following. Supervisory failure is a causal factor in 62 percent of Class
A flight mishaps during fiscal year 1990 through 1996. Fifty one percent of the
supervisory failures are labeled as unsafe supervisory conditions. The unsafe aircrew
events contained: 28 percent of the flight mishaps as aeromedical, 48 percent as CRM
and three percent as readiness. The unsafe aircrew act event contained 87 percent as
accidental and 40 percent as violations. (Nutwell & Sherman, 1997). Notably, in a report
issued in 1997 by the DON, forty percent of the volations were conscious aircrew
breeches of procedures, Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) and NATOPS.
Ciavarelli's and Figlock's (1997) CSA study was conducted to assess a
command's safety climate from an aircrew perspective and the perceived effectiveness of
its safety related programs. Its objective was to analyze the effectiveness of managing
risks in flight operations. The study, based on a model of high reliability organizations,
shows significant room for improvement in risk management, human factors evaluation,
and aircrew coordination training. The study's survey develops a tool that provides
commanding officers and aviation safety officers (ASO) a capability for self assessment
of the effectiveness of their commands safe operations (Nutwell & Sherman, 1997).
The HFQMB formed ten Process Action Teams (PAT) for areas that require
intervention: Leadership, Policy, Organizational Effectiveness, Safety Information
Management, Training and Qualifications, Standard Operating Procedures, Mishap
Investigations, Operational Risk Management, Human Factors Evaluation and
Aircraft/Aircrew Systems. The PAT were tasked to assess each area using the
information taken from benchmarking, the MDA, and CSA, to identify area
improvements, and recommend actions resulting in an awareness of human factors, causal
factors of mishaps and, ultimately, to achieve a mishap rate reduction.
To date, there has been little emphasis on the potential contribution of human
factors on maintenance operations. The HFQMB's first thrust was aimed at supervisory
(62 percent) and aircrew (56 percent) causal factors due to the large percentage of
mishaps involved, whereas discussed earlier, maintenance was found in 17 percent of the
mishaps. In 1997, the Navy and Marine Corps had an impressive year; its class A flight
mishap rate was the second lowest ever recorded and it was the Navy's best ever recorded
(NSC, 1998). Success in the intervention of these two areas has led to interest in
developing efforts directed at the maintenance causal factors.
The same three-pronged approach was adopted by the HFQMB for taking an in-
depth look into Naval Aviation maintenance operations for the identification of hazards
and the development of intervention possibilities (Figure 5) (Schmidt, 1998).
Benchmarking is currently underway and mishap data analysis is now completed. The
benchmarking efforts have determined that risk management contributes to enhanced
safety in terms of maintenance error prevention, lower mishaps, and reduced personal
injuries. Organizational culture and climate, facilitation of crew coordination and team
performance, effective training and certificate programs, and emphasis on policy and
procedure adherence are all areas where risk management contributes to enhanced safety.
These findings reflect some of the problem areas found in an analysis of Class A flight
mishaps that involved maintenance depicted issues related to supervisory, crew
coordination, training/qualifications, and adherence to policy and procedures. The
results from benchmarking and mishap data analysis in conjunction with the previous
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CSA questionnaire were used to develop a candidate list of questions for a maintenance
questionnaire.
B. PURPOSE
The purpose of this study is to develop, administer, and validate a questionnaire
survey to assess the effectiveness of Naval Aviation maintenance operations in the
management of risk. This study analyzes survey data and builds on a Model of
Organizational Safety Effectiveness (MOSE) developed by Dr. Ciavarelli and LtCol
Figlock (1996) of the School of Aviation Safety, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey,
CA. The results will improve our understanding of the possible influences of human
factors in aviation maintenance related mishaps, and will provide a tool for assessing
safety in maintenance operations. The intent is to identify potential interventions in an
effort to lower human error in maintenance-related mishaps and the overall mishap rate.
C. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Given the sustained presence of human error in aviation maintenance, it is
essential to develop a valid Maintenance Climate Assessment Survey targeting the
maintainer's perspective on safety and flight practices. Given this need, the existing CSA
questionnaire based on the present MOSE must be adapted to address maintenance issues.
It entails possible expansion and necessary modification of the existing questionnaire,
which is geared towards aircrew, and the development of maintenance specific items.
This thesis explores the following questions:
1. Can the present MOSE be adapted to capture the maintainer's perspective?
2. Do the close-ended questions (questions with fixed responses) in the MCAS
conform to the existing MOSE components?
3. Can the prototype MCAS be reduced through either the elimination of
redundant questions or combination of such questions?
4. Are there discemable differences between squadrons surveyed, and does there
appear to be any consensus?
5. Does the maintenance data support the components / structure of the
maintenance adapted MOSE?
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
The intent of this study is to gain a better understanding of the Naval Aviation
maintenance safety climate, understanding that efforts are underway to look into the
supervisory and aircrew factors. Three California based Reserve Squadrons are used as
subjects in the survey due to their availability, accessibility, close proximity; this effort is
a preliminary study. Neither Marine Corps units nor active duty personnel participated in
this study, nor did any Tactical Air Squadrons. Only the Naval Aviation maintenance




It has been evident for most of recorded history that people are prone to commit
errors- "To err is human." As our technology expands, as our wars multiply, and as we
invade more and more of nature, we create systems - organizations, and the organization
of organizations - that increase the risk for the operators, passengers, innocent bystanders,
and for future generations. Most of these risky enterprises have catastrophic potential, the
ability to take the lives of hundreds of people in one blow, or to shorten or cripple the
lives of thousands or millions more (Perrow, 1984). Catastrophic errors in a system are
often the result of the gradual aggregation of small errors across a system. Considering
organizations as systems, and as parts of systems, is important in order to understand how
organizations work, and how to best mitigate risk in them (Grabowski & Roberts, 1996).
Advances in technology have increased the reliability of most system components, but the
percentage of human error-related incidents and accidents has remained fairly constant.
B. STUDY FRAMEWORK
The theoretical framework for the construction of the maintenance questionnaire
survey used in this study is derived from the work done by Ciavarelli and Figlock (1997)
at the School of Aviation Safety, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. The
framework is based on key attributes of successful organizational risk management
processes identified by Libuser (1994) and Roberts (1990), and from a safety climate
analysis published by Zohar (1980). The existing CSA questionnaire was generated using
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academic resources and professional questionnaires, which provided guidance regarding
design and construction of questionnaires (Ciavarelli and Figlock, 1997).
Five major areas concerning the effectiveness of organizations at managing risk
are identified in a model developed by Libuser (1994). These areas included process
auditing, a reward system, quality of operations, risk perception and command and
control. Libuser's work was adapted by Ciavarelli and Figlock (1997) to develop a
Model of Safety Effectiveness (MOSE) that incorporates standard Naval aviation
language and safety practices. The five MOSE components are summarized as follows:
1. Process Auditing - a system of ongoing checks to identify a hazardous
condition and a process to take corrective actions.
2. Reward System - a system to recognize and reward safe behaviors, and to
discourage unsafe behaviors.
3. Quality standards - Sets control procedures to monitor quality and correct
deviations to referenced standards.
4. Risk Management - Systematic process to identify and manage risk.
5. Command and Control - Established policies and procedures to conduct safe
operations.
A complete description of the MOSE components is provided in Appendix A.
Ciavarelli and Figlock's (1997) short term goal is to provide the QMB with
feedback on issues concerning aviation command climate, morale of Naval Aviation
personnel, squadron workload and resource availability, the estimated success of ongoing
safety interventions, and other factors related to safely managing Naval flight operations.
Their long-term goal is to develop, validate and apply methods for assessing and
mitigating risk in organizations that must, by the nature of their business, conduct
hazardous operations. They develop and apply questionnaire survey methodology to
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assess the effectiveness of Naval Aviation units in the management of risks associated
with flight operations. This study is the first of several planned investigations intended to
improve the understanding about possible influences of organizational factors in aircraft
accidents, specifically understanding what possible influences a Naval Aviation
command may have on the chain of events leading to an aircraft mishap (Ciavarelli &
Figlock, 1997).
C. ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND CLIMATE
Roberts (1990) examines organizations that are successful in managing risks
associated with hazardous operations. She labels this type of an organization as a "high-
reliability" organization (HRO), which operates in hazardous environments yet produces
a very low rate of accidents and incidents. Grabowski and Roberts (1996) contend that
strong cultures and norms that reinforce their mission and goals characterize HROs. A
culture is defined as the shared values, beliefs and assumptions that may govern decision
making, attitudes, safety, and proper conduct within an organization. Norms are rules and
regulations that guide and control the behavior of individuals and organizations. They
focus attention on procedures, policies, and reward structures that are consistent with the
organization's mission. Grabowski and Roberts (1996) find that various cultures
operating in large-scale systems are the glues tying the segments together.
Zohar (1980) finds strong evidence that organizations with successful safety
programs have a strong management commitment to safety. She determines that in low
accident companies, top management is personally involved in safety activities on a
routine basis, and safety matters are given high priority in company meetings and in
production scheduling. This underlying safety climate refers to the shared perception of
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an organization's members that the organization's leaders are genuinely committed to
safety of operations. She contends that such a climate results in increased performance
reliability of workers, good housekeeping, and high design and maintenance standards for
work environments.
D. HRO: CLIMATE AND CULTURE
To operate a complex system successfully, the human-machine system must be
supported by an organizational infrastructure of operating concepts, rules, guidelines, and
documents. In high-risk endeavors such as aircraft operations, it is essential that such
support be flawless, as the price of deviations can be high. When operating rules are not
adhered to, or the rules are inadequate for the task at hand, not only will the system's
goals be thwarted, but there may also be tragic human and material consequences (Degani
& Wiener, 1994). Both Roberts (1990) and Libuser (1994) believe that organizations
operating safely and effectively have certain key characteristics in common. Leadership
style, sound safety management policies, procedure standardization, adequacy of
resources and staffing, and a defined system for risk management are such characteristics.
In large-scale systems, maintaining or developing a culture of safety and reliability can be
important in mitigating risk. Oversight, checks and balances, and strong cultural norms
are organizational protections and buffers that reinforce an organization's goals; they can
mitigate risk by assuring errors are caught, that appropriate organizational norms are
developed and reinforced, and that the system improves over time (Grabowski & Roberts,
1996).
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E. AVIATION MAINTENANCE AND RAMP ACTIVITIES
As anyone working in aviation maintenance knows, there have been a number of
serious, even fatal, accidents over the years that were caused primarily by maintenance
errors (Reason & Maddox, 1998). Boiled down to its essence, the task of a maintenance
mechanic is to take off and then replace some of the three to four million removable parts
on a modern aircraft platform. Much goes on in between, of course, but these basic steps
of disassembly and re-assembly remain constant features of the work — the latter attracts
by far the largest number of errors (Reason, 1990). The maintenance area is an unstable
environment in a number of different ways: from the point of view of human factors it
does not compromise a well-designed work environment. Problems range from complex
activity and congestion in a poorly delineated environment to the problems of controlling
the movement of large objects in space with inadequate information and cues (McDonald
& Fuller, 1994). It is clear that problems with human factors still exist in aircraft
maintenance facilities - even those that are built in strict accordance with the prevailing
architectural standards (Maddox, 1998). Therefore, within maintenance activities, the
human operator' s role is critical to safe and efficient operations.
The technology of the ground handling process also poses interesting problems for
safety. Aircraft are designed to fly; they are not optimally designed for ramp operations.
The aircraft's size and location in space relative to the operator invite misperceptions and
misjudgments of distance and location; the fragile skin and appendages of an aircraft are
easily damaged and such damage if undetected, can have disastrous consequences in
flight. The cyclical nature of the ramp operator's job often requires immediate and
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demanding increases of both mental and physical performance from a resting and perhaps
fatigued level (McDonald & Fuller, 1994).
There are many factors within a maintenance and ramp activity that can be
associated with failures (Reason & Maddox, 1998). These factors can have an adverse
effect upon the working practices of those within the maintenance and ramp areas and
hence, human performance. Factors within the workplace are known as local errors, and
those that lie within the organization, organizational factors. The organizational factors
create the local errors.
One such local factor is the knowledge, skills and experience of maintenance
personnel; personnel can be unfamiliar with a defect or aircraft type, lack specific training
or skills and have inappropriate experience to perform proper maintenance. A morale
factor can exist; people clash in personality, get frustrated, or can be unhappy with the
work situation. Availability of tools, equipment and parts quality may be another factor.
Other local factors may include fatigue, the pressures of a high workload, problems with
shift patterns, and environmental problems. Unclear manuals and procedures, quality of
safety equipment and training may also be present (Maddox, M, 1998).
An organizational factor may be organization structures; there can be concerns
about restructuring and downsizing, ill-defined duties, or too many layers of management
in the organization. People management, the lack of top level awareness of problems that
technicians face, and ill-defined career paths, may be an issue. Training, operational
pressures, planning and scheduling problems and communication within the organization
can also be examples of organizational factors. These factors are usually present within
most maintenance facilities, and can directly impact the climate within which the
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maintenance technician or ground handler must cope. The maintenance and ramp activity
is a dangerous work environment presenting the risk of death or disabling injury to those
involved. There is an ever-present potential for unreported ground handling damage to
aircraft while in the hangar or on the ramp. Therefore, policies and procedures are
needed to minimize this potential (Maddox, 1998).
F. PHILSOPHY, POLICY, PROCEDURES AND PRACTICES
Philosophy, policy, procedures and practices, the four P's, are recognized as
important aspects in flight deck operations (Degani & Wiener, 1994). Philosophy deals
with the over-arching view of how the organization will conduct business, including
flight operations. An organization's philosophy is largely influenced by the
organization's leaders, and also by its culture. Policies are broad specifications of the
manner in which management expects operations such as training, flying, and
maintenance to be performed. An organization's policy embodies the philosophy.
Procedures should be designed to be as consistent as possible with the policies,
which are consistent with the philosophy. Procedures exist to specify what the task is,
when the task is conducted and by whom, how the task is done, and the sequence of
actions needed to perform the task. Practices are an extension of and are governed by the
philosophy, policies and procedures within an organization. A practice is the activity
actually conducted on the flight deck and it is the ultimate factor that determines the
quality of a systems output. The goal of management is to promote 'good' practices by
specifying coherent procedures (Degani & Wiener, 1994). Maintenance, like flight deck
operations, is an activity that relies heavily on the four P's described above; there is the
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leadership philosophy, the policies within the maintenance department, the Standard
Operating Procedures (SOP), and the technician's or mechanics practices.
G. ASSESSMENT AND INTERVENTION OF RISK
Looking at all the components within the MOSE and seeing if these apply to the
Naval Aviation maintenance community is called its assessment. Do the five components
of process auditing, reward system and safety culture, quality, risk management, and
command and control relate to maintenance? Assessing maintenance operations shows
that indeed, these components are present. There is a need for the auditing of
maintenance logs and SOP. A strong safety culture is a must; everyone must be safety
conscious and identify safety problems. Quality control is the heart of maintenance,
maintenance is definitely a high-risk environment, and leadership must be present to
ensure the commitment to safety.
Intervention is the gathering of data from a process, the attempts to fit a model to
the data, and learning more about the process. A better understanding of the
organizational factors related to safely managing maintenance operations is needed and
desired. A survey of the maintenance community, based on the MOSE adapted for
maintenance, is one method of intervention. Surveys are most appropriate when
information should come directly from people involved with the process. Surveys
provide data describing attitudes, values, habits, and background characteristics such as
age, education and income (Fink & Kosecoff, 1985). Ciavarelli and Figlock's (1997)
MOSE can be adopted to incorporate maintenance terms and language, thus developing a
needed tool for intervention.
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H. SUMMARY
Organizational culture has an effect on the entire organization. This is especially
true in high-risk organizations where potential outcomes of a system failure can be
catastrophic and costly. Naval Aviation is recognized as a high-risk organization, which
can experience devastation if something goes awry. This is also true in the aviation
maintenance community. Several approaches have been made to improve the overall
safety of Naval Aviation: a system safety analysis, an analysis of mishap data and surveys
to improve the understanding of organizational issues pertaining to operators. If the
concepts of systems safety and organizational accidents are to be advanced, aviation
management at all levels must be aware of them (Reason, 1990). There is a need to
develop a survey to gain a better understanding of the organizational influences on
maintenance error. In looking at different survey methods, a self-administered survey





The intent of this study is to develop a Maintenance Climate Assessment Survey
(MCAS) for the Naval Aviation Maintenance community that captures the maintainer's
perception and understanding of the risks within their department and in performing their
mission. This study involves the analysis of data from a prototype survey that is based on
an existing model of high-risk organizations. This is done to identify factors that may
improve safety within aviation maintenance. The data analysis entails descriptive
statistics, cluster analysis and factor analysis.
B. DATA COLLECTION
1. Subjects
A total of three Naval Air Reserve Force squadrons, two located at NAS North
Island and one at Moffett FAF, are surveyed. The first is a Fixed Wing Fleet Logistics
Support (VR) Squadron composed of active duty and selected reserve personnel
providing seven-day-a-week round the clock, worldwide logistics to support the Navy and
Marine Regular and Reserve forces. The second consists of a Fixed Wing Maritime
Patrol (VP) Squadron with a worldwide theater of operations, composed of Selected
Reservists and active duty personnel (Note: This squadron is decommissioning).' The
third squadron consists of a Rotary Wing Combat Support (HCS) Squadron with a
mission of Search and Rescue, Combat Support via the launch and recovery of targets and
torpedoes on the Southern California Offshore Range (SCORE).
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The survey respondents are primarily Navy enlisted personnel who work in
aviation maintenance departments. Maintenance personnel from the VR Squadron
located at the Naval Air Station (NAS) North Island, CA were used to test the reliability
and consistency of the prototype survey. The survey was then administered to two other
groups of maintenance personnel from the VP and HCS Squadrons.
2. Instrument
The prototype MCAS consists of 15 demographic and 67 maintenance related
questions. Demographic questions included inquiries about rank, community, shift
worked, total years of service, and total years of aviation maintenance experience. They
also include inquiries about unit home location, rating, age and current maintenance
qualifications. The demographic questions preserve anonymity of particpants; names,
social security numbers, work section, etc are not asked for. The MCAS is constructed
using an existing air operations oriented Command Safety Assessment survey (CSAS) as
a basis.
Questions from the CSAS are re-worded to relate to "Maintainers" with
maintenance terms. A focus group discussed all 156 candidate questions to reduce
redundancy and ensure proper phrasing (Appendix B lists the candidate questions).
Survey questions are fitted to the existing components as outlined in the current MOSE
and new areas are created to fit any remaining questions. The MOSE components consist
of Process Auditing, Reward Systems and Safety Culture, Quality, Risk Management, and
Command & Control. Additional questions, proposed by current maintenance experts,
are also incorporated into the MCAS. All questions are partitioned according to the
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MOSE components, and the residual questions are examined. They fit under a sixth
category peculiar to maintenance vice air operations: Communication / Relationships.
The MCAS questions are separated into the MOSE components of Process
Auditing, Reward System and Safety Culture, Quality, Risk Management, Command and
Control, and Communication / Relationships. Eight of the 67 questions cover Process
Auditing, 10 cover the Reward System and Safety Culture component, 12 cover Quality
as well as Risk Management, 14 cover Command & Control and 11 cover the
Communication / Relationships component. Eight of the 67 questions are worded
negatively, where a positive response is indicated by a low value. The survey questions
utilize a five point Likert rating scale with the following verbal anchors: Strongly
Disagree, Moderately Disagree, Neutral, Moderately Agree, and Strongly Agree (The
MCAS is included in Appendix C).
3. Procedure
The MCAS is distributed in person. All persons taking the MCAS are told what
the survey is, why it is being given and told that their responses are completely
anonymous. The Fleet Support Squadron received the MCAS during a safety stand
down. Groups of 10 to 15 people were administered to until all available personnel had
taken the survey. Each person was given approximately 15 to 20 minutes or more time if
needed, to take the survey. The Patrol Squadron MCAS was given one on one going
from office to office throughout the squadron's workspaces over a drill weekend. The
MCAS was handed out in a workspace and the participants were individually told what
the survey was, why it was needed and that their individual responses would not be
reported. The workspace MCAS took much longer to administer because participants
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had a job to do. Some MCAS forms were completed right away, some were collected a
few hours later. Throughout the workday and the workspaces, the MCAS were collected
on an individual basis. The Combat Support Squadron personnel took the survey at the
beginning of a safety brief over a drill weekend. The Squadron personnel were split into
two groups of 30 to 40 people. Each group was given approximately 15 to 20 minutes or
more time if needed, to take the survey. The MCAS was collected at the time it was
completed. For each squadron, each survey was hand numbered for future order.
C. DATA ANALYSIS
1. Data Tabulation
Survey demographics and responses are hand entered into an Excel (Microsoft,
1996) spreadsheet. The spreadsheet consists of rows of respondents and columns of
survey questions. The first fifteen columns are for demographics, with another sixty-
seven columns representing the actual survey questions. Results are coded in the
spreadsheet by assigning scores of 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 corresponding to the Likert scale of
Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Neutral, Agree and Strongly Agree, respectively. Questions
8, 20, 22, 39, 40, 41, and 54 are negative in wording and ask respondents to answer
opposite to how they respond to the other questions. Survey questionnaire items that had
no response are left blank and were dealt with by S-PLUS (Mathsoft, 1997) as the data is
transformed into a SPLUS 4.0 data frame for complete data analysis.
2. Statistical Analysis
Basic summary statistics are developed. Descriptive analysis is conducted on the
data to describe basic and general information about the demographic and question
results. These results include the distribution of survey participants by rank and service
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classifications, and the total sample, mean and standard deviation for each of the 67
survey questions. The S-Plus 4.0 (Mathsoft, 1997) program is used for multivariate
statistical analyses. Clustering methodologies such as agglomerative nesting and divisive
analysis utilizing the S-PLUS functions AGNES and DIANA are used to answer the third
research question with the aid of factor analysis. Factor and principal component
analyses are performed to answer the second and fifth research questions, utilizing the S-





Descriptive statistics of survey participants are presented in Table 1. For each
participating Squadron, Fleet Support, Patrol and Combat Support, there are two
columns. The column titled "All" is representative of all survey participants for the
respective squadron. The column with the heading "Maint" pertains to maintenance
respondents only. Table 1 lists the numbers of officers, E1/E3, E4/E6, and E7 and above
for each squadron as well as the number of TAR, SELRES and USN designated
personnel.
Fleet Support Patrol Combat Support All
SqaudronsParticipants Sqaudron Sqaudron Sqaudron
All Maint All Maint All Maint All Maint
Officers 14 1 13 14 41 1
E1/E3 7 7 2 2 7 7 16 16
E4/E6 77 68 71 67 42 39 190 174
E7+ 10 10 7 7 4 4 21 21
Total 108 86 93 76 67 50 268 212
SELRES 65 47 59 45 34 26 158 118
TAR 42 38 34 31 32 23 108 92
USN 1 1 1 1 2 2
Total 108 86 93 76 67 50 268 212
Table 1. Distribution of Survey Participants.
From Table 1 , the maintenance personnel involved in taking the survey represent
79 percent of the total survey population. Maintenance E4/E6 enlisted personnel
represented a total of 82 percent of the data analyzed in this thesis. This is important to
note because most of the maintenance work and work supervision is done at this level.
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B. MAINTENANCE RESPONSE STATISTICS
The MOSE component results for maintenance respondents are presented in
Tables 2 through 7 (The MOSE component results for all respondents are tabulated in
Appendix D). Tables 2 through 7 list the maintenance results for all three Squadrons for
each of the six MOSE components. The tables show total respondents for each question
(n), average rating for each question on a "1" to "5" Likert scale and the standard
deviation for each question. It is interesting to note that average results amongst the
squadrons are relatively similar. Also noted is that for the eight questions of the MCAS
worded negatively, the respondent's answers reflect as expected.
The first MOSE component presented in Table 2 is Process Auditing. There are
eight questions in this component. The only question that raises a concern is number 59
(overall mean = 2.73). All three Squadrons rate this question below neutral, in the
disagree direction of the Likert scale. The question entails the use of safety staff to
manage personnel at risk. A better, more effective use of safety staff and a higher
presence of safety staff within the squadron may be a possible way to influence this
perspective in the positive direction. The remaining eight questions are answered









Total Avg StdDev Total Avg StdDev Total Avg StdDev Total Avg StdDev
1 86 4.42 0.458 76 4.38 0.653 50 4.42 0.758 212 4.41 0.623
2 86 3.79 0.897 76 3.79 0.838 50 3.74 1.121 212 3.77 0.952
3 86 4.47 0.699 75 4.19 0.766 49 4.33 0.774 210 4.33 0.746
4 86 4.41 0.879 75 4.29 0.785 50 4.16 0.889 211 4.29 0.851
5 85 4.60 0.576 76 4.83 0.444 50 4.62 0.667 211 4.68 0.562
46 85 4.25 1.093 75 4.11 0.649 50 4.20 0.782 210 4.18 0.841
59 85 2.66 1.418 76 2.55 1.136 50 2.98 1.237 211 2.73 1.264
67 85 3.18 1.004 75 3.39 0.999 50 3.08 1.175 210 3.21 1.059
Table 2. Process Auditing MOSE Component.
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The Reward System and Safety Culture MOSE component is presented in Table
3. Ten questions comprise this component, with two that are negatively worded,
questions 41 and 54. These two questions appear to be a problem, but reverse coding
shows that they are answered positively (mean range = 3.49 to 4.02, and 3.02 to 3.45










Total Avg StdDev Total Avg StdDev Total Avg StdDev Total Avg StdDev
6 85 3.51 1.158 76 3.68 0.996 50 3.82 1.155 211 3.67 1.103
7 85 3.93 1.281 75 3.99 0.814 50 3.84 1.167 210 3.92 1.087
18 86 4.24 0.916 76 4.17 0.870 50 3.98 1.078 212 4.13 0.955
19 85 3.35 1.874 76 4.01 0.887 50 4.08 0.922 211 3.82 1.228
36 84 3.37 1.320 74 3.20 1.007 49 3.10 1.141 207 3.22 1.156
41 86 2.51 1.406 76 2.24 1.118 50 1.98 1.040 212 2.24 1.188
53 86 3.64 1.198 76 3.47 0.945 50 3.56 1.091 212 3.56 1.078
54 85 2.66 1.418 76 2.55 1.136 50 2.98 1.237 211 2.73 1.264
58 85 4.14 1.075
j
76 4.26 0.719 49 4.04 1.172 210 4.15 0.989
60 85 4.31 0.715 | 76 4.32 0.697 50 4.32 0.913 211 4.31 0.775
Table 3. Reward System and Safety Culture MOSE Component.
The third MOSE component is Quality. This component has twelve questions,
with one question, number twenty (mean range = 4.00 to 4.05), requiring reverse coding.
All questions in this component, except one, are answered positively (mean range = 3.45
to 4.37). Question 37 (overall mean = 2.82) is answered in a negative manner. This
question relates to staffing; Is it sufficient from shift to shift. The Quality component










Total Avg StdDev Total Avg StdDev Total Avg StdDev Total Avg StdDev
9 86 4.23 0.577 76 4.20 0.654 50 4.40 0.571 212 4.28 0.601
10 84 3.68 1.160 75 3.61 0.769 50 3.70 0.953 209 3.66 0.961
17 86 4.29 0.632 75 4.20 0.838 50 4.28 0.858 211 4.26 0.776
20 86 1.97 1.281 76 1.95 1.044 50 2.00 1.161 212 1.97 1.162
37 84 2.63 1.344 75 3.07 0.991 50 2.76 1.205 209 2.82 1.180
42 86 3.45 1.757 74 3.80 0.979 50 3.80 1.143 210 3.68 1.293
44 86 4.24 0.987 75 4.28 0.745 50 4.26 1.006 211 4.26 0.913
45 84 4.32 1.040 76 4.29 0.745 50 4.28 0.927 210 4.30 0.904
47 85 4.37 0.830 76 4.42 0.735 50 4.66 0.557 211 4.48 0707
48 84 3.92 1.354 76 4.26 0.755 50 4.32 0.768 210 4.17 0.959
49 83 3.82 1.467 76 3.93 0.971 50 3.92 1.047 209 3.89 1.162
50 84 3.61 1.567 76 4.05 0.893 50 4.16 1.095 210 3.94 1.185
Table 4. Quality MOSE Component.
Risk Management is the fourth MOSE component and it has twleve questions,
with three questions, numbers 12 (mean range = 2.84 to 3.03), 22 (mean range = 3.55 to
3.88), and 40 (mean range = 2.93 to 3.12), requiring reverse coding. All but one of the
questions were answered positively (mean range = 2.98 to 4.33). Question 51 (overall
mean = 2.78) has negative responses. This question concerns equal workloads and equal
stress / fatigue between shifts. This negative perception may be of some concern. The









Total Avg StdDev Total Avg StdDev Total Avg StdDev Total Avg StdDev
11 84 2.98 1.180 74 3.00 0.828 50 3 24 0.847 208 3.07 0.952
12 85 2.97 1.344 75 3.16 1.027 49 2.98 1.145 209 3.03 1.172
21 85 3.93 1.019 76 3.83 0.790 50 3.98 0.915 211 3.91 0.908
22 86 2.45 1.757 76 2.12 0.966 50 2.14 1.125 212 2.24 1.283
. 23 85 3.75 1.188 76 3.67 0.999 49 3.57 1.155 210 3.67 1.114
24 86 4.33 0.599 76 4.21 0.754 50 4.18 0.873 212 4.24 0.742
40 86 3.07 1.619 74 2.88 0.859 50 2.88 1.223 210 2.94 1.234
51 84 2.54 1.481 73 3.18 0.887 50 2.64 1.156 207 2.78 1.175
55 85 3.46 1.346 75 3.73 1.004 50 3.46 1.092 210 3.55 1.147
61 85 3.99 1.107 76 4.15 0.706 50 4.12 0.961 211 4.08 0.925
62 84 4.12 0.925 76 4.20 0.783 50 4.28 0.784 210 4.20 0.831
63 84 3.76 1.437 76 3.95 1.018 50 4.14 0.948 210 3.95 1.134
Table 5. Risk Management MOSE Component.
Command and Control is the fifth component of the MOSE model. It comprises
the largest number (14) of questions in the survey, with question 39 worded negatively.
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Reverse coding question 39 (mean range =2.54 to 2.92) shows that it is responded to
negatively in the survey. Question 39 deals with passdown between shifts within the
command. All other questions in this component were answered positively (mean range
= 2.96 to 4.68). Table 6 tabulates the results for the maintenance survey for the









Total Avg StdDev Total Avg StdDev Total Avg StdDev Total Avg StdDev
13 86 4.41 0.621 76 4.28 0.759 50 4.32 0.713 212 4.33 0.698
14 85 3.92 0.910 75 3.93 0.875 50 4.16 0.817 210 4.00 0.867
25 86 4.00 0.918 76 4.05 0.798 50 4.08 0.900 212 4.04 0.872
26 86 3.90 1.036 76 4.13 0.660 50 4.04 0.968 212 4.02 0.888
27 86 3.91 0.932 75 4.08 0.749 50 3.92 0.966 211 3.97 0.882
28 86 3.94 0.950 76 3.95 0.798 50 3.90 0.886 212 3.93 0.878
29 86 3.71 1.173 75 3.27 1.212 50 3.76 1.153 211 3.58 1.179
30 86 3.81 1.259 76 4.08 0.707 50 4.06 0.998 212 3.98 0.988
38 85 3.82 1.242 76 3.72 1.015 50 3.74 1.026 211 3.76 1.094
39 85 3.35 1.541 75 3.08 0.941 50 3.46 1.129 210 3.30 1.204
56 85 4.45 0.703 76 4.47 0.621 50 4.68 0.551 211 4.53 0.625
64 85 4.01 0.964 76 4.00 0.766 50 4.16 0.842 211 4.06 0.857
65 84 3.81 1.264 76 3.96 0.807 50 4.14 0.904 210 3.97 0.992
66 83 2.96 1.206 75 3.07 0.920 50 3.14 0.990 208 3.06 1.039
Table 6. Command and Control MOSE Component.
The final component of the MOSE is Communication / Relationships. This
component has eleven questions, with question eight (mean range = 3.23 to 3.70) worded
negatively. Questions 34 (overall mean =2.99) and 43 (overall mean = 2.64) show some
concern, resulting in response values less than three. The Communication / Relationship










Total Avg StdDev Total Avg StdDev Total Avg StdDev Total Avg StdDev
8 84 2.77 1.575 75 2.39 1.102 50 2.30 1.165 209 2 49 1.281
15 86 3.63 1.531 76 3.33 1.038 50 3.28 1.161 212 3.41 1.243
16 85 3.86 0.956 74 3.53 0.954 50 3.68 0.794 209 3.69 0.901
31 86 3.73 1.257 76 3.40 1.034 50 3.52 1.216 212 3.55 1.169
32 85 4.01 1.083 76 4.34 0.684 50 3.88 1.154 211 4.08 0.974
33 86 3.92 0.970 75 3.96 0.892 50 3.94 0.998 211 3.94 0.953
34 86 2.90 0.918 73 3.16 1.028 50 2.90 1.055 209 2.99 1.000
35 85 3.65 1.612 75 3.43 1.029 50 3.32 1.115 210 3.46 1.252
43 84 2.80 1.440 75 2.48 1.178 50 2.64 1.174 209 2.64 1.264
52 86 3.79 1.203 75 3.99 0.762 50 3.92 0.900 211 3.90 0.955
57 85 3.94 1.151 76 4.03 0.730 50 4.10 1.035 211 4 02 0.972
Table 7. Communication / Relationship MOSE Component.
Each question within the MOSE is answered positively for all participating
squadrons. The average for all questions in each MOSE component was computed and is
tabulated in Table 8.








Process Auditing 3.97 3.94 3.94 3.95
Reward System 3.73 3.83 3.78 3.78
Quality 3.88 4.01 4.05 3.98
Risk Management 3.52 3.67 3.63 3.61
Command & Control 3.81 3.85 3.90 3.85
Comm/Functional Relationships 3.59 3.57 3.41 3.56
Table 8. MOSE Component Summary Results.
C. ANALYSIS PROBLEM
The dataset used in this portion of the analysis uses only the Maintenance surveys.
Of the total 268 surveys collected, 212 were from Maintainers. These 212 responses are
used to form a data matrix, X, to be studied and analyzed using the S-Plus statistical
package. If X is n by k, then n = 212, the total number of survey respondents and k = 67,
the number of survey questions presented.
The problem is to reduce the existing k MCAS items to a more reasonable number
for a full-scale survey. An acceptable number of questions for a survey is in the range of
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25 to 40 questions (Fink, 1985). Clustering methods such as agglomerative nesting and
divisive analysis are sensible tools for such problems.
These methods belong to the family of hierarchical clustering methods that
produce a tree-like hierarchy. This structure is most conveniently visualized through a
dendrogram such as the one depicted in Figure 6. The vertical scale is a distance measure
that marks the levels at which two clusters are joined to make one. The horizontal is a
nominal scale on which the item designators are permuted so that the tree arcs do not
cross one another. From the bottom up we can view how the k items are joined to form
successive clusters. The use of such information can help provide a dispassionate guide
for grouping the 67 items into a more reasonably sized set.
D. AGGLOMERATIVE NESTING (AGNES)
Two S-PLUS algorithms are used, AGNES and DIANA. Agglomerative nesting
(AGNES) is discussed first as it is the easier to describe. It is a "bottom up" approach so,
initially, there are (k=67) clusters; each single item is viewed as a cluster. First, one
selects a distance measure. Suppose euclidian distance is chosen and is initially
computed as the distance between each pair of questions. One finds the smallest value of
this set and forms a cluster of the two items associated with it. Now, there are k-1
clusters instead of k, and the distance of all items from the new cluster of two must be
computed and used to replace the 2 * (k-2) distances of the two selected items from all
others that have been supplanted. They are needed no more but there is a choice in
defining the new distances. It was chosen to average the distances between all pairs of
items, one from each cluster, to obtain a distance figure separating two clusters. This
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done, again the smallest distance is chosen for forming the next new cluster, etc. The
process continues until there is but one cluster consisting of all k items. The user can
select the clustering solution that suits him/her. Scanning the vertical scale is often useful
for this purpose.
The agglomerative nesting function called "AGNES" in S-PLUS package is used
as a first method to cluster the k questions or variables of the Maintenance safety survey
into fewer questions. The S-PLUS function "AGNES" is called using the command
agnes(daisy (t (X) ) ,diss=T) . The S-PLUS function "daisy" is used to calculate
the dissimilarity matrix for X. The "diss=T" statement means that a dissimilarity matrix
is to be used in the computations to serve as the distance function. This choice
corrresponds to the one described.
Results from AGNES are then plotted using the pltree.agnes S-PLUS function.
The pltree.agnes function produces a clustering tree of agglomerative hierarchical
clustering when it is passed an AGNES object. It creates a plot of a clustering tree. The
leaves of the tree are the original objects or in this case, the k questions. Two branches of
the tree come together at the distance between the two clusters being merged. Figure 6


















Figure 6. AGNES Clustering Tree.
The AGNES function returns an object containing the following items: order,
height, agglomerative coefficient, and a matrix called merge. Order is a vector giving a
permutation of the original objects to allow for plotting, in the sense that the branches of
a clustering tree will not cross. Height is a vector with the distances between merging
clusters at the successive stages. The agglomerative coefficient (ac) measures the amount
of clustering structure found in the dataset. More explicitly to each item i, denoted by
m(i), the dissimilarity to the first cluster it is merged with, is divided by the dissimilarity
of the merger in the final step of the algorithm. The ac value is the average of all the { 1-
m(i)}. The resulting ac value produced by AGNES is 0.5445873. The AGNES object
has a resulting merge matrix, describing the merging of clusters at steps within the
clustering process. It provides the numerical support for the dendrogram.
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Merge is a (k-1) by 2 matrix, where each row i of merge describes the split at step
k-i of the clustering. The merge item returned using AGNES is important. This matrix is
a road map for reading the clustering tree plot resulting from the pltree.agnes function.
This matrix and the tree plot are used as an aid in clustering the questionnaire items.
First, pairs are clustered utilizing the interpretations of the merge matrix. Next, triple and
quad clusters are identified. Easily identified pairings, triples and quads are shown in the
Table 9. Also shown in Table 9 are the singles, eight questions that do not merge with
previously constructed clusters until high in the tree.
Sin<ales Pairings Triples Quads
7 43 2,14 26,27 44.45 10,16 37,51 1,9,13 11,66,67 44,45,46,48
19 52 3,4 29,31 46,48 18,24 39,40 6,29,31 12,39,40 8,20,22,41
32 53 5,47 30,33 49,50 22,41 57,58 10,16,38 56,60,62 19,35,42,55
35 63 9,13 34,36 56,62 42,55 61,65 61,64, 25,26,27,28
66,67
.
Table 9. AGNES Clustering.
From these identified pairings, additional items were then added by using the
corresponding merge information until all questions were covered. Table 10 shows the
remaining questions and how they were added to the initial clusters. It shows the
questions, identified by the AGNES algorithm, that are near in distance.
(2,14) (1,5,9,13,17,47,56,60,62) (11,34,36,66,67) (46,48) (37,51)
(3,4) (6,10,15,16,23,29,31,38) (8,20,22,41,54) (49,50) (39,40)
(30,33) (44,45,57,58,59,61,64,65) (18,21.24,25,26,27,28) (42,55)
Table 10. Additional AGNES Clustering.
E. DIVISIVE ANALYSIS (DIANA)
The AGNES algorithm is a bottom up approach to hierarchical clustering. The
DIANA algorithm reverses this process. It is top down and the resulting tree need not be
the same. The distance between clusters is used for explanatory purposes.
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The process begins with a single cluster of all items and then considers all
possible partitions of the items into two clusters. (It is convenient to think of it in this
way, although efficient algorithms exist which do not actually do this.) The pair of
clusters selected is the one with the greatest separation. Then the process is repeated using
each of the clusters so formed, etc. Ultimately, the cluster will consist entirely of single
items. The dendrogram for this method appears in Figure 7. Comparing Figure 6 and
Figure 7 it is seen that the trees are quite similar. This is a comforting check.
The divisive analysis function called "DIANA" in the SPLUS package is used as
an approach to "cluster" the k questions into a tree. The DIANA function in S-PLUS is
called using diana (daisy (t (X) ) , diss=T) , where X represents the data matrix
used in AGNES. Again, the S-PLUS function "daisy" is used to calculate the
dissimilarity matrix for X. The "diss=T" statement means that the same dissimilarity
matrix is to be used in the distance computations.
Results from DIANA are then plotted using the pltree.diana function to look at the
clustering results. The S-PLUS function pltree.diana creates a plot of a clustering tree or
dendrogram given a DIANA object. The leaves of the tree lead to the k original objects or
questions. A branch splits up at the diameter of the cluster being split. Figure 7 shows the
resulting tree of "clusters" from the DIANA analysis.
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Figure 7. DIANA Clustering Tree.
The DIANA function returns the following items: "order", "height", the "divisive
coefficient", and "merge". Order is a vector giving a permutation of the original objects to
allow for plotting, in the sense that the branches of a clustering tree will not cross. Height
is a vector with the diameters of the clusters prior to splitting. The divisive coefficient
measures the amount of clustering found. More explicitly, for each item i, denoted by
d(i), the diameter of the last cluster to which it belonged ( prior to being split as a single
object ), divided by the diameter of the whole set. The dc measure is the average of all
{ l-d(i)}. The divisive coefficient resulting from DIANA is found to be 0.6559955. Like
the AGNES object, the DIANA object has a resulting merge matrix, describing the
merging of clusters at steps within the clustering process.
Again, the merge matrix and the tree plot are used as an aid in clustering the
questionnaire items. First, pairs clustered are identified and analyzed to see if they make
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sense. Next, triple and quad clusters are identified. Easily identified pairing are shown in
the Table 11.
Singles Pairings Triples Quads
19 2,14 12,40 30,33 56,60 1,9,13 12,40,43 11,34,37,51
23 3,4 18,24 37,51 57,58 10,16,38 20,22,41 19,42,55,53
35 5,47 22,41 42,55 61,65 15,29,31 30,32,33 25,26,27,28
39 9,13 25,26 44,45 62,64 17,18,24 44,45,46,48
43 10,16 27,28 46,48 66,67 61,62,64,65
53 11,34 29,31 49,50
Table 11 DIANA Clustering.
From these identified pairings, additional items are then added using the
corresponding merge information until all questions are covered. Table 12 shows the
remaining questions and where they are added to the initial pairings. It shows the
questions, identified by the DIANA algorithm, that are near in distance.
(1,5,9,13,47,56,60) (57,58,59,61,62,63,64,65) (8,20,22,41,54) (6,10,16,23,38) (3,4)
(11,12,34,37,40,43,57) (15,29,31,35,36,39,66,67) (30,32,33,52) (2,7,14) (49,50)
(44,45,46,48) (21,25,26,27,28) (19,42,53,55) (17,18,24)
Table 12. Additional Clustering with DIANA.
Comparing the two S-PLUS methods of AGNES and DIANA shows some
interesting aspects. First, by comparing the two clustering trees, the shape of each tree is
very similar. The initial pairings found in the two methods are alike also. Of the 23
initial pairings from DIANA and the 21 pairings from AGNES, 17 are common to both.
Moving up the clustering tree one level, more similarities are seen. Furthermore, by
looking at higher levels of the two clustering trees, clusters of three or four questions




2,14 9,13 22,41 37,51 46,48 1,9,13 25,26,27,28
3,4 10,16 29,31 42,55 49,50 10,16,38 8,20,22,41
5,47 18,24 30,33 44,45 57,58 61,64,65 44,45,46,48
61,65 66,67
Table 13. Common Clusters Between DIANA and AGNES.
F. PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS / FACTOR ANALYSIS
The Principal Component / Factor Analysis material will help complete the
questionnaire size reduction process. Principal Component Analysis was conducted on
the dataset using the S-PLUS software package. The S-PLUS command of
princomp(X,scores=T,cor=T) was used in the analysis. X is the 212 by 67 matrix of
survey responses and "cor=T" means that the principle component analysis is to be based
on the correlation matrix. The resulting principle component output was plotted using a
screeplot, a special S-PLUS barplot function for the class princomp. The S-PLUS
function screeplot(prin2.out) was used. It shows the contribution of each factor to the
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Figure 8. Principal Component Screeplot.
Above each bar in the plot are the cumulative fractions of the variance. The
variance is sharply the highest on the first component and spread rather evenly over the
remaining components. This shows evidence that the survey data is dominated by one
dimension. Much of the variability is captured in the first component. This and Factor
Analysis is used to assist in answering research questions three and five.
Factor analysis on the data is performed using S-PLUS. The S-PLUS command
of factanal(X,factors=6,method="principal", rotation="varimax") was used. Again, X is
the 212 by 67 matrix of survey responses, six factors were fit, using varimax rotation as
the method of aligning the factors in a six dimensional space. The "factors=6" input
specifies the number of factors in the solution. An object of class factanal results.
The factanal class results from fitting factor analysis models. This class has
certain properties that are relevant to analyze. An important property is "loadings."
Loadings is an orthogonal matrix that gives the loadings for each factor, each column
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being linear combinations of the columns of X for the corresponding factor. Another
property of the factanal class is uniqueness. The variance of each item is decomposed
into the part that is common to the factor solutions and the part that is unique to that item.
The loadings and uniquenesses for each question in the corresponding components of the
MOSE are presented in Tables 14 through 19.
Question Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 Factor 6 Uniqueness
1 0.462 0.306 0.149 0.176 0.6381
2 0.337 0.278 0.189 0.219 0.263 0.6553
3 0.525 0.281 -0.133 0.102 0.268 -0.147 0.5263
4 0.452 0.214 0.131 0.230 -0.140 0.6555
5 0.478 0.107 0.167 0.195 0.6862
46 0.612 0.117 0.146 0.5897
59 0.234 0.596 0.243 0.133 0.148 0.4885
67 0.143 0.339 0.436 0.152 0.6506
Table 14. Factor Loadings for Process Auditing Component.
Question Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 Factor 6 Uniqueness
6 0.273 0.216 0.378 0.207 0.338 0.5693
7 0.401 0.287 0.180 0.267 0.322 0.5456
18 0.459 0.313 0.297 0.384 0.4447
19 0.366 0.128 0.139 0.8288
36 0.314 0.117 0.329 0.441 -0.160 0.5576
41 -0.402 -0.213 0.116 -0.253 -0.455 0.5007
53 0.239 0.131 0.202 0.277 -0.105 0.7925
54 -0.179 -0.188 -0.372 -0.165 0.7532
58 0.249 0.593 0.152 0.310 0.149 0.4392
60 0.282 0.625 0.112 0.204 0.224 0.133 0.4073
Table 15. Factor Loadings for Reward and Safety Culture.
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Question Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 Factor 6 Uniqueness
9 0.507 0.207 0.200 0.227 0.5898
10 0.440 0.141 0.373 0.284 -0.100 0.5573
17 0.617 0.221 0.133 0.250 0.101 0.4796
20 -0.222 -0.327 0.116 -0.258 -0.464 0.5402
37 0.118 0.537 0.184 0.121 0.6469
42 0.276 0.147 0.412 0.121 0.245 0.6564
44 0.520 0.239 0.124 0.189 0.181 0.5830
45 0.469 0.159 0.154 0.152 0.6991
47 0.657 0.188 0.5148
48 0.567 0.115 0.461 0.143 0.4258
49 0.425 0.215 0.238 0.250 0.214 0.6017
50 0.401 0.333 0.410 0.205 0.152 0.4908
Table 16. Factor Loadings for Quality.
Question Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 Factor 6 Uniqueness
11 0.129 0.343 0.114 -0.275 0.7637
12 0.166 -0.365 0.8236
21 0.572 0.158 0.226 0.256 0.5284
22 -0.243 -0.146 -0.293 -0.473 0.6092
23 0.162 0.252 0.149 0.363 0.144 0.7275
24 0.487 0.33 0.415 0.194 0.4371
40 -0.128 -0.445 0.7717
51 0.496 0.178 0.101 0.6977
55 0.19 0.33 0.414 -0.112 0.193 0.312 0.5364
61 0.239 0.638 0.321 0.157 0.176 0.3709
62 0.365 0.591 0.305 0.135 0.192 0.12 0.3550
63 0.372 0.418 0.225 0.246 0.178 0.167 0.5159
Table 17. Factor Loadings for Risk Management.
Question Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 Factor 6 Uniqueness
13 0.483 0.240 0.158 0.272 0.183 0.5747
14 0.415 0.280 0.287 0.101 0.256 0.104 0.5800
25 0.330 0.301 0.165 0.553 0.131 0.109 0.4384
26 0.328 0.338 0.258 0.609 0.3318
27 0.417 0.155 0.218 0.642 0.166 0.3063
28 0.376 0.327 0.206 0.563 0.147 0.3690
29 0.338 0.198 0.213 0.176 0.523 0.4972
30 0.388 0.248 0.316 0.312 0.246 0.165 0.5029
38 0.378 0.131 0.335 0.454 0.131 0.5032
39 0.107 -0.108 -0.372 0.8253
56 0.314 0.485 0.229 0.183 0.108 0.195 0.5305
64 0.238 0.609 0.211 0.231 0.193 0.4305
65 0.210 0.587 0.387 0.141 0.103 0.4293
66 0.158 0.196 0.579 0.122 0.5808
Table 18. Factor Loadings for Command and Control.
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Question Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 Factor 6 Uniqueness
8 -0.160 -0.166 -0.107 -0.268 -0.101 -0.295 0.7663
15 0.136 0.264 0.337 0.159 0.521 0.120 0.4876
16 0.449 0.263 0.199 0.441 0.4908
31 0.206 0.226 0.248 0.279 0.621 0.3735
32 0.339 0.142 0.252 0.307 0.122 0.6877
33 0.336 0.417 0.156 0.372 0.191 0.5109
34 0.122 0.232 0.320 0.317 -0.145 0.7043
35 0.300 0.348 0.7644
43 0.166 0.9669
52 0.441 0.181 0.308 0.208 0.6322
57 0.185 0.585 0.122 0.195 0.220 0.228 0.4701
Table 19. Factor Loadings for Commuinication / Relationships.
For each component, the questions having the maximum loading over the six
factors are analyzed. As true in the principle component analysis, there is one factor,
Factor one, which had the most loadings having the maximum value. This analysis, with
results shown in Table 20, shows the relationships between the factors resulting from the
factor analysis and the MOSE components. Of the 67 questions, 25 of them load the
highest in factor one. This provides quantitative information on these items that are
represented in the single most important factor dimension.
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 Factor 6
Component 1 1,2,3,4,5,46 59 67
Component 2 7,18,19 58,60 6 54 36,53 41
Component 3 9,10,17,44,45,47,48,49 37,42,50 20
Component 4 21,24 61,62,63 11,51,55 23 12,22,40
Component 5 13,14,30 56,64,65 39,66 25,26,27,28 29,38
Component 6 16,32.52 33,57 15 34 15,16,31,34,35,43 8
Table 20. Questions and Factors Loadings Broken Out by MOSE Component.
Table 21 shows the distribution of the questions over the Factors and MOSE
components resulting from the factor analysis. Interesting to note is the number of
questions that belong to factor 1 . Twenty five of the 67 questions in the MCAS fall into
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the first factor. The remaining factors have loadings with various signs and provide
contrast type information about the items that dominate them.
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 Factor 6 Component Totals
Component 1 6 1 1 8
Component 2 3 2 1 1 2 1 10
Component 3 8 3 1 12
Component 4 2 3 3 1 3 12
Component 5 3 3 1 4 2 1 14
Component 6 3 2 1 4 1 11
Factor Totals 25 11 9 6 9 7 67
Table 21. Distribution of Questions From Factor Analysis.
Also interesting to study is the cumulative distribution function of the
uniquenesses for each question resulting from the factor analysis. This is important to
study because the questions with low uniqueness in the large, have their content
represented by other questions. The questions with high uniqueness have individual
dominating status. From this, one may be able to identify questions that can be
eliminated because they may be non-contibutors. Also, we can identify questions of high
uniqueness, which either should be retained as singletons, or identified as dominating the
group to which they belong. Figure 9 is the resulting S-PLUS CDFDISC function plot of






Figure 9. Question Uniqueness Empirical CDF.
Looking at the plot above gives a good view of the uniqueness for the questions.
Note the flat spot appearing in Figure 9 at the 0.4 uniqueness level on the x-axis. The
questions relating to these uniqueness values are possible candidates for elimination since
they all have relatively low uniqueness. Below is Table 22 showing the seven questions









Table 22. Questions with Low Uniquenesses.
There is also a flat area Figure 9 at the 0.75 uniqueness level on the axis
identifying questions with high uniqueness relative to the entire set. All uniquenesses to
the right of 0.75 relate to those having a relatively high uniqueness. There are ten such













Table 23. Questions with High Uniqueness.
All of this information is useful to aid the researcher in making informative
decisions about the items in the data. Each of the above areas of analysis are used in
conjunction with one another to obtain the goal of a reduced set of questions to be used in
an improved and modified MCAS.
G. QUESTION ANALYSIS
The S-Plus functions AGNES, DIANA, PRINCOMP and FACTANAL assist the
researcher in making decisions or objective choices about the items. These will be
viewed for reasonableness based on subjective knowledge. The stability of these choices
and the results from the analysis are also influenced by the relatively small sample size
involved in this study. With this in mind, the questions are studied using the computer-
aided output from the previous sections. The prototype MCAS had questions that
required reverse coding. It is recommended these questions be rephrasedto read in a
positive aspect. (Appendix H lists these questions and the recommended modifications.)
Decision rules need to be identified as to how the downsizing of the MCAS is
approached. First, the seven questions identified with low uniqueness are removed.
Likewise, questions identified, as having high uniqueness, will be retained. Secondly, all
pairs that are the same in both AGNES and DIANA are studied for combination or to see
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if the questions can be reworded to make one out of the two. This done, the next step is
to take all triples and then quadruples identified by the clustering algorithms and look for
sensible combinations or removal of questions. At the completion of this, the remaining
questions that have not been grouped or clustered will be studied for further sensible
reduction.
Questions having low uniqueness are eliminated. There are seven such questions
that have been identified in Table 22. The elimination of these seven questions results in
a remaining pool of 60 questions. Furthermore, we retain the ten questions identified in
Table 23 that have high uniqueness. This leaves 50 questions for continued analysis.
Next, the cluster analysis results from AGNES and DIANA are used for combining
questions that are answered in similar ways or show redundancy.
Questions paired up that are common to both the AGNES and DIANA methods
are analyzed to see if the pairings can be combined easily. Here, questions are paired up
due to their relative closeness resulting from the computer-aided output. Questions are
studied and if sensible, can be joined with the conjunction "and" or reworded to capture
the intent of the original questions. For example, the first pairing from Table 13 is the
pair (9,13). By rewording these questions slightly, a new question results that replaces
the two questions with one.
This process is done for all identified clusters in Table 13 as well as possible
clusters from Tables 9 and 11. Table 24 lists these groupings. Appendix F gives the
suggested rewording of these newly formed questions to be included in the suggested
MCAS.
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Nineteen questions are suggested as candidates for combining, rewording or
grouping that reduce the MCAS question total by an additional 24 questions. A sensible
pairing is made from two questions having high uniqueness. DIANA identifies pair
(19,53) as a cluster and AGNES shows agreement in that the dendrogram has the pairing
in close proximity to one another. This pair belongs to the same MOSE component and
the two questions have the same intent, thus the two are combined into one. Question 1
1
also had high uniqueness but it was sensible to cluster it as noted in Table 24.
1,9,13 11,36,59,67 20,22 49,50
2,14 10,66 30,33 52,56
3,4 16,38 42,55 57,58
5,47 18,21,24 37,51 64,65
6,23 19,53 45,46,48
Table 24. Suggested Question Groupings.
Nine singletons result in this process. These questions neither clustered with
others nor seemed reasonable to combine with any other question in the MCAS. These




Table 25. Original Questions Remaining.
By combing the results in the first step, deleting the questions with relatively low
uniqueness and then combining questions using the cluster analysis results, the MCAS
reduces to 35 questions; seven from the high uniqueness, 19 from the clustering or
rewording, and an additional nine as singletons. There is a judgement call here, and
given the data and the questions, this seems to be as far as one can go without adding
additional scrutiny to the study. Table 26 gives the suggested mapping of the 67-question
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prototype MCAS to a suggested 35-question MCAS. The P-Type column contains the
ordinal number of the item in the original 67-question MCAS, and the Mapped column
displays the ordinal number in the suggested 35-question MCAS.
P-Type Mapped P-Type Mapped P-Type Mapped P-Type Mapped P-Type Mapped P-Type Mapped P-Type Mapped
1 6 11 a 21 13 31 Deleted 41 25 51 22 61 Deleted
2 1 12 9 22 15 32 Deleted 42 26 52 31 62 Deleted
3 2 13 6 23 16 33 19 43 27 53 14 63 34
4 2 14 1 24 13 34 20 44 28 54 32 64 35
5 3 15 10 25 17 35 21 45 29 55 26 6; 35
6 16 16 11 26 Deleted 36 8 46 29 56 31 66 7
7 4 17 12 27 Deleted 37 22 47 3 57 33 67 8
8 5 18 13 28 Deleted 38 11 18 29 58 33
9 6 19 14 29 18 39 23 30 59 8
10 7 20 15 30 19 40 24 50 30 60 Deleted




The existing MOSE can be used to model or capture the maintainer's perspective,
with modifications presented in this thesis. The close-ended questions, after tailoring
them towards the maintainer, conformed to the existing MOSE components quite readily.
However, an additional component, Communication / Relationships, was added to make
the MOSE maintenance specific. Results of the prototype MCAS were positive in nature
for all six of the adapted MOSE components except for a few questions that raised
concern and these are listed in Table 27. These questions may possibly identify areas that









59 2.66 2.55 2.98 2.73
37 2.63 3.07 2.76 2.82
51 2.54 3.18 2.64 2.78
39 2.65 2.92 2.54 2.7
34 2.9 3.16 2.9 2.99
43 2.8 2.48 2.64 2.64
Table 27. Questions That Raise Concern.
There are no discernable differences identified between the squadrons that were
surveyed. A consenus between all participating squadrons was that of favorable results
for all MOSE components. Agglomerative nesting and Divisive Analysis together with
Prinicpal Components and Factor Analysis were tools used to identify clusters of
questions that were similar. Although the Factor Analysis shows that most of the
questions load on factor one, there is no evidence against the structure of the maintenance
adapted MOSE. Redundant questions were eliminated and questions with similar intent
were combined. Thus, the prototype MCAS was reduced from 67 to 35 questions,
51
shortening the survey to a more practical length, requiring less time to complete. The
finalized MCAS is listed in Appendix I.
B. OTHER AREAS OF CONCERN
There are numerous future studies that can further this thesis. One such task
would be to alter the questionnaire in order to use it with the Marine Corps, using
"Marine" specific terms. Also, this study could be further investigated by surveying
active duty Naval Aviation Squadrons to make comparisons of the results with the
Reserve Squadron results presented in this study. The Marine Squadron results could be
compared to Navy Squadrons to see if there is a statistical difference between the two.
Another task would be to administer the survey to Regular active duty Squadrons and do
a comparison between Reserve and active duty Squadrons. Also, other analysis methods
could be used to validate this study and its results.
C. SUMMARY
The Class A flight mishap rate has leveled off over the past decade. Human
Factors studies are increasing as they tyy to identify additional areas where intervention
could lead to further reductions of the Class A flight mishap rate. This thesis is part of a
Human Factors related study specifically aimed at Maintenance operations within Naval
Aviation. The resulting survey is to be used as a tool for commanders to assess the
effectiveness of Naval Aviation maintenance operations in the management of risk.
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APPENDIX A. EXISTING MOSE COMPONENTS
COMPONENT 1: PROCESS AUDITING
1
.
Conducts periodic safety reviews and inspections.
2. Conducts timely reviews and updates of safety practices and operating standards.
3. Uses a systematic process to set training goals and to review flight qualifications.
4. Uses Human Factors Councils and Boards to identify and screen high-risk aviators.
5. Makes effective use of Flight Surgeon for assessing significant stress reactions, and
possible unsafe attitudes of individuals as well as routine medical screening.
COMPONENT 2: REWARD SYSTEM
1. Recognizes safety achievement through social praise, and formal awards and
incentives.
2. Safe behavior is reinforced as a cultural norm (by command emphasis and peer
pressure).
3. Takes timely action (s) to appropriately discipline unsafe behavior and attitudes.
4. Encourages everyone to be safety conscious and to identify safety problems.
5. Encourages everyone to report safety discrepancies without fear of negative
repercussions.
COMPONENT 3: QUALITY
1. Sets high quality standards as an organizational goal.
2. Publishes quality standards and quality control procedures.
3. Monitors quality and corrects deviations from established quality standards.
4. Gains reputation for high-quality performance in comparison to reference standards or
comparable organizations.
COMPONENT 4: RISK MANAGEMENT
1. Has accurate perception of actual operational mission risks.
2. Uses a systematic method for managing risk.
3. Risks of mission operations are acknowledged and minimized.
4. Safety risk decisions are made at the proper level (by most qualified people).
5. Resources (time, budget, staffing, and equipment) are adequate for performance of
mission and organizational workload.
6. Does not compromise safety to get the work done or to accomplish the mission.
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COMPONENT 5: COMMAND AND CONTROL
1
.
Supervisors openly demonstrate a commitment to safety.
2. Supervisors clearly communicate safety goals and policies.
3. Supervisors are directly involved in safety management.
4. Safety is considered as an integral part of mission accomplishment.
5. The command establishes and uniformly enforces operating standards.
6. There is frequent interaction between command supervisors and staff.
7. There is good communication flow up and down the command chain.
8. Safety training is emphasized throughout the command.
9. The status and respect for the safety officer's position are high.
10. Personnel turnover is not high enough to affect a command's ability to maintain
"corporate" knowledge and the core cultural values of the organization.
11. Supervisors provide adequate guidance and counseling on safety matters.
12. Formal rules and procedures are followed, whether or not command supervisors are
physically present.
13. There is redundancy, multiple coverage or adequate safety backups for high-risk
operations.
14. Personnel in the command conduct continuous proficiency training.
15. Training incorporates safety guidelines and safeguards.
16. Leadership has vision and understands how to create a positive climate.
17. The prevailing values, beliefs, attitudes, and norms (culture) promote safe
behavior/discourages unsafe behavior.
18. Leadership sets example for written policy, standards, proper procedures, and
acceptable norms of behavior.
19. The command clearly establishes responsibility and accountability, for safe flight
operations at all levels.
20. Command leaders have an accurate perception of the motivation, morale, and job
satisfaction level of their people.
21. Command leadership reacts well, and readily adapts to unexpected changes.
PROPOSED COMPONENT 1: PROCESS AUDITING
1
.
My command adequately reviews and updates safety practices.
2. The command has a dedicated program that targets individual training deficiencies.
3. My command monitors maintainer qualifications.
4. Support equipment licensing is monitored in this command.
5. Tool control is taken seriously at my command.
6. CDIs/QARs routinely monitor maintenance evolutions.
7. My command uses safety staff to manage personnel at risk.
8. The command uses medical staff to manage occupational hazards and personnel at
risk.
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PROPOSED COMPONENT 2: REWARD SYSTEM AND SAFETY CULTURE
1. My command recognizes individual safety achievement through rewards and
incentives.
2. Unprofessional behavior is not tolerated in the maintenance department.
3. Supervisors encourage reporting safety concerns without fear of retribution.
4. Supervisors discourage violations of SOPs, or NAMP guidelines.
5. My MO/MCPO understands if I feel uncomfortable performing maintenance duties
due to personal issues.
6. Violations of SOP, NAMP guidelines, or other procedures are common in my
command.
7. Peer influence discourages violations of SOP, NAMP guidelines or other procedures.
8. Personnel are uncomfortable telling supervisors about personal problems including
illness.
9. Individuals feel free to report safety violations, unsafe performance, or other unsafe
behavior.
10. Our command climate promotes safe maintenance and flight operations.
PROPOSED COMPONENT 3: QUALITY
1. My command has established standards and maintains quality control.
2. CDIs/QARs are sought after positions in my command.
3. Inspectors perform all required actions before sign off.
4. To meet operational commitments, supervisors allow "cutting corners."
5. Maintainer staffing is sufficient from shift to shift.
6. Proper tools and equipment are available, servicable and used.
7. Required publications are available, current and used.
8. Maintenance gripes are either corrected or addressed prior to flight.
9. My command has a reputation for quality maintenance.
10. The QA division is respected in my command.
11. Signing off PQS/JQRs/PARs is taken seriously and not gun decked.
12. Maintenance quality on detachments is the same as that in homeport.
PROPOSED COMPONENT 4: RISK MANAGEMENT
1. My command temporarily restricts maintainers who are having personal problems.
2. Based upon my command's current manning and assets, it is over-committed.
3. Supervisors manage hazards associated with maintenance and flight line operations.
4. Supervisors are more concerned with mission completion than aircraft maintenance.
5. My division CPO is aware of individual daily workload requirements.
6. Unsafe conditions are recognized and addressed by M/C, Q/A, or W/C supervisors.
7. Personnel turnover negatively affects my command's ability to operate safely.
8. Day and night check have equal workload and are equally stressful/fatiguing.
9. I am provided adequate resources (time, personnel, and equipment ) to accomplish my
job.
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10. Safety decisions are made at the proper command levels.
11. Safety is part of maintenance planning, and additional training/support is provided as
needed.
12. Maintainers are never purposely put in an unsafe situation to meet the flight schedule.
PROPOSED COMPONENT 5: COMMAND AND CONTROL
1. My command ensures all maintainers are responsible and accountable for safe
maintenance.
2. My command ensures the uniform enforcement of SOPs among unit maintenance
personnel.
3. Supervisors communicate command safety goals, programs, and procedures.
4. Supervisors are actively involved in the safety program and management of safety
matters.
5. Supervisors set the example for compliance to established maintenance standards.
6. Supervisors are responsive to unexpected changes and anticipate potential hazards.
7. W/C supervisors are respected by the maintenance chief/officer.
8. All maintenance evolutions are properly supervised by qualified personnel.
9. Maintenance control is effective in managing all maintenance activities.
10. Multiple job assignments and collateral duties adversely affect maintenance.
1 1
.
In my command, we believe safety is an integral part of all maintenance and flight
line operations.
12. Safety education and training in my command are comprehensive and effective.
13. The safety department is respected by supervisors and maintainers.
14. Maintenance Safety Petty Officer is a sought after billet in my command.
PROPOSED COMPONENT 6: COMMUNICATION / RELATIONSHIPS
1
.
My command has a problem with passdown between shifts.
2. Within my unit, good communication flow exists up and down the chain of command.
3. Coordination is conducted between the M/C, W/C and QA prior to incorporation of
TDs.
4. Work center supervisors, division CPOs and M/C work well together.
5. Aircraft moves are briefed and detailed personnel are qualified.
6. Maintainers are briefed on potential hazards associated with maintenance activities.
7. My supervisor shields me from outside pressures, which may affect my work.
8. QARs are never pressured by the maintenance supervisors to sign off a gripe.
9. Maintenance Control never troubleshoots aircraft discrepancies.
10. QARs are viewed as helpful, and QA is not "feared" in my command.
1 1. 1 feel I get all information (internal and external) required to perform my job safely.
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APPENDIX B. CANDIDATE MAINTENANCE QUESTIONS
1. My command has a reputation for high quality maintenance.
2. My command is genuinely concerned about safety.
3. Command leadership is successful in communicating its safety goals to unit
personnel.
4. My command provided a positive climate that promotes safe maintenance and flight
operations.
5. Command leaderships is actively involved in the safety program and management of
safety matter.
6. Command leadership sets the example for compliance to established standards.
7. My command conducts adequate reviews and updates of safety practices.
8. My command ensures that all unit members are responsible and accountable for safe
maintenance and flight operations.
9. Command leadership permits "cutting corners" to get the job done.




Command leadership encourages reporting safety discrepancies without fear of
negative repercussions.
12. Individuals in my command are willing to report information regarding safety
violations, marginal performance, or other unsafe behavior.
13. My command has a defined process to set training goals and to review performance.
14. Loss of experienced personnel has negatively affected my command's ability to
operate safely.
15. Command leadership willingly assists in providing advice concerning safety matters.
16. My command has established quality standards and strives to maintain quality control.
17. Command leadership considers safety issues during the formation and execution of
operational and training plans.
18. Command leadership has a clear picture of the risks associated with its maintenance
and flight line operations.
19. My command takes the time to identify and assess risks associated with its
maintenance and flight line operations.
20. My command does a good job managing risks associated with its maintenance and
flight line operations.
2 1 My command closely monitors proficiency and currency standards to ensure
maintenance personnel are qualified to perform their assigned tasks.
22. My command provides adequate safety backups to catch possible human error during
hi-risk tasks.
23. Command leadership reacts well to unexpected changes to its plans.
24. In my command, we believe safety is an integral part of al maintenance and flight line
operations.
25. My command has increased the chances of a mishap due to inadequate or incorrect
risk assessment.
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26. My command does not hesitate to temporarily restrict from maintenance tasks
individuals who are under high personal stress.
27. 1 am adequately trained to safely conduct all of my assigned tasks.
28. 1 am provided adequate resources (time, staffing, budget, and equipment) to
accomplish my job.
29. No equivalent.
30. My collateral duties adversely affect my ability to accomplish my maintenance tasks.
31. Morale and motivation in my command are high.
32. My command ensures the uniform enforcement of operating standards among unit
personnel.
33. 1 have adequate time to prepare for my assigned tasks.
34. Command leadership is effective at discouraging violations of operating procedures,
NAMP guidelines or general maintenance discipline.
35. In my command, peer influence is effective at discouraging violations of operating
procedures, NAMP guidelines, or general maintenance discipline.
36. My command's SOP is effective at promoting safe maintenance and flight line
operations.
37. 1 am very familiar with the policies and regulations contained in the OPNAVINST
4790.2 series.
38. Rest standards are enforced in my command.
39. Based upon my command's personnel and other assets, the command is over
committed.
40. In my command, PC/CDI/QAR tests and monitors are conducted as intended, to
candidly assess maintainer qualifications.
41. Strict enforcement of NAMP standards is upheld in my command.
42. In my command, anyone who intentionally violates NAMP/NAMSOP is swiftly
corrected.
43. In my command, violations of operating procedures, NAMP regulations, or general
maintenance or flight line operation discipline are rare.
44. Within my command, good communication flow exists up and down the chain of
command.
45. My command has good two-way communication with external commands.
46. Procedures in my command are adequate to effectively conduct Human Factors
Councils or Boards.
47. Human Factors councils have been successful in identifying maintenance members
who pose a risk to safety.
48. Human Factors Boards have been successful in managing the high-risk maintainer.
49. My command makes effective use of the flight surgeon to help identify and manage
high-risk personnel.




Safety education and training are adequate in my command.
52. The safety department is a well-respected element of my command.
53. The Maintenance Safety Petty Officer position is a sought after billet in my command.
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54. My commands safety department keeps me well informed regarding important safety
information.
55. My command has received adequate guidance, information, and training regarding
Maintenance Risk Management.
56. My command has begun to implement MRM processes into decision-making at all
levels.
57. The QA division is well respected in my command.
58. CDI is a sought after position in my command.
59. QAR is a sought after position in my command.
60. The EAWS program is considered to have integrity in my command.
61. A coordinated brief is conducted between M/C, the W/C and QA prior to
incorporating the AFB/AFC's, etc.
62. CDI/QARs perform routine monitors of maintenance evolutions.
63. Requirements for PPE use are strictly enforced.
64. The qualifying of CDI/QAR's is considered to be a fair process.
65. Decisions on who should be CDI/QAR are made fairly and without favoritism.
66. Support equipment licensing is closely monitored.
67. Requirements for having SE licenses are taken seriously.
68. The "signing-off ' of PQS/JQRs/PARs, etc. is taken seriously and managed with
integrity, (not gun decked)
69. Maintenance Control provides for adequate time to complete the job when assigning
tasks.
70. Performing incomplete daily inspections is not tolerated in my command.
7 1
.
Inspectors never sign off the "inspected by" block without physically performing the
required inspection.
72. Work center supervisors work well with M/C.
73. W/C supervisors are respected by maintenance management in my command.
74. W/C supervisors are respected by the "troops" in my command.
75. W/C supervisors are always asked their opinion by M/C.
76. QA is a "feared" organization in my command.
77. All participants involved in an aircraft move are briefed prior to commencing the
move.
78. All maintenance evolutions are well supervised.
79. Maintenance evolutions are OVER supervised.
80. Anyone in my command can stop a maintenance evolution if they feel that an unsafe
condition exists.
81. All pilots strictly follow plane captain directions/signals.
82. Work center shift passdowns are conducted face to face.
83. Daily maintenance meetings encourage feedback from work centers.
84. All work centers utilize a written passdown log.
85. Division CPOs ensure 100% participation at monthly maintenance safety meetings.
86. Workers with "bad attitudes" are not permitted to work on or around aircraft or other
equipment.
87. Utilizing someone's NALCOMIS password is strictly prohibited.
88. Maintenance Control is ALWAYS in control of maintenance.
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89. 1 have confidence that all personnel are qualified to perform their assigned tasks.
90. "Down" gripes are taken seriously by QA.
91. "Down" gripes are taken seriously by M/C.
92. Repeat gripes are monitored by QA and regarded as serious.
93. Publications are always used when performing maintenance.
94. Maintenance Control never troubleshoots from behind the M/C counter.
95. Plane captains always carry daily decks when performing daily inpsections.
96. A799s are taken seriously.
97. Maintenance training is conducted regularly and taken seriously by maintenance
management.
98. CPO's are regarded as the technical experts and get involved in troubleshooting tough
gripes.
99. CPO's over supervise maintenance tasks.
100. Tool Control is taken seriously at my command.
101. The maintenance control chief is respected.
102. My CO is proud of the maintenance department.
103. Squadron pilots feel comfortable flying the aircraft in this command.
104. Our maintenance department is considered to be the best in the wing.
105. Short cuts are tolerated when the flight schedule dictates.
106. The maintenance department works for the operations department.
107. The goals of the maintenance department are clearly defined.
108. Command leadership is more concerned with mission completion that aircraft
material conditions.
109. PPE is available for use when needed.
1 10. Most maintenance is performed by NX.
111. NX maintainers are considered to be proficient.
1 12. NX maintainers are considered to be as professional as DX.
1 13. "Khaki presence" is evident at this command.
1 14. NX is well represented with CPO's.
1 15. Shortcuts are tolerated more at night than DX.
1 16. Working nights is more risky than working days.
1 17. Maintainers would never be put in an unsafe situation to make the flight schedule.
1 18. Maintenance performed on detachments is a lesser quality than that at homeport.
1 19. W/C supervisors are allowed to run their shops without interference from M/C.
120. W/C supervisors feel pressure from M/C.
121. Maintenance is only performed "by the book."
122. Work priorities are clearly set at the shift change maintenance meetings.
123. Use of overdue calibration equipment is not tolerated.
124. Maintenance personnel are often over worked.
125. Personnel are allowed to work on aircraft or equipment when "hung-over."
126. Personnel are not comfortable telling supervisors that they have personal
problems.
127. NX works longer shifts than DX.
128. Personnel are assigned more than one task at a time making it difficult to
concentrate on one job.
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129. My maintenance officer/MCPO would understand if I did not feel comfortable
working on an aircraft or equipment because I was having a family problem.
130. Publications are available, understandable, and used.
131. I am comfortable admitting to my supervisor that I have made a mistake.
132. Supervisors tolerate "short-cuts."
133. Most maintainers would rather cover up a mistake than admit to it.
134. Admitting to having an illness such as a cold is considered trying to "weasel out
of work."
135. My work center is undermanned.
136. My division CPO is aware of my daily workload.
137. M/C would never put me in work on a job that could put me in an unsafe
situation.
138. I am never rushed to complete a task.
139. Much of the pressure from M/C to complete a job is perceived and not real.
140. My supervisor is responsible for informing M/C if I feel they are
pressuring/rushing me.
141. All known problems are addressed or corrected prior to an aircraft being released
"safe for flight."
142. I am considered to be an important part of our maintenance department.
143. I feel comfortable reporting someone who I consider puts me in an unsafe
situation.
144. Unprofessional behavior is not tolerated in the maintenance department.
145. Maintenance management encourages me to perform maintenance "by the book."
146. Disciplinary problems are not considered by maintenance management to affect a
person's ability to perform his/her job.
147. If an unsafe condition existed, it would be recognized by M/C, Q/A, or the W/C
supervisor before it became a problem.
148. All personnel in my department are physically capable of doing there jobs.
149. Intentional violations of proper procedures are dealt with swiftly.
150. QA is looking out for my safety.
151. I am briefed on al possible hazards associated with performing a job prior to
starting that job.
152. QA is considered to be the technical experts.
153. QA is never pressured by maintenance leadership to sign off a gripe.
154. My job is as important as the aircrews.




APPENDIX C. PROTOTYPE MCAS
Purpose : The purpose of this survey is to try and gain valuable insight into the maintenance community's
perception concerning aviation mishaps within the Navy and Marine Corps. Your participation and answers
will be used as a guide in the Navy's on-going efforts to lower the aviation mishap rate.
The first fifteen questions, part I, regard biographical data; information particular to yourself. This
information will aid in the analysis of your responses. NO attempts will be made to identify individual
respondents or their organizations.
Part II has 67 questions pertaining to the maintenance community. Please respond to the questions with
the answer that most correctly reflects your honest opinion. Using a #2 pencil, completely darken each
response.
Thank you in advance for your participation!
PLEASE RESPOND TO EACH ITEM.
I. Your rank? ( ) E-l - E-3 ( )E-4 - E-6 ( )CPO E-7 + ( )Officer
2 . Your community?
VF ( ) HSL( )
HCS ( ) VX ( )
VAW ( )
3. Your designator? ( LDO, 152X, etc )? / NEC
4. Are you currently a department head? ( ) Yes ( ) No
5. Your service? ( ) USN ( ) USNR TAR ( ) SELRES ( ) Other
6. Your shift? ( ) DX ( ) NX ( ) MidX ( ) Other, specify
7
.
Total years of service?
8 Total years of Aviation Maintenance experience?
9. A-School graduate? ( ) Yes ( ) No ( ) N/A
10. Education level
: ( ) GED ( ) High School ( ) College, # of years
II. Unit home location? ( )East coast ( )West Coast ( ) Other
VFA ( ) HS ( ) VMFA ( )
VMA ( ) HC ( ) VP ( )
VR ( ) VQ ( ) VAQ ( )
12. Your rating? ( ) AD/AM ( ) AE/AT ( ) PR/AME ( ) AO ( ) Other
13. Your age? ( ) 17-20 ( ) 21-25 ( ) 25-30 ( ) 30+
14. Current maintenance qualifications?
( )Safe for Flight ( ) CAR
( ) CDI ( ) Supervisor
( )SPO ( )N /A





My command adequately reviews and updates
safety practices.
2. The command has a dedicated program that
targets individual training deficiencies.
3. My command monitors maintainer qualifications. ( )
4. Support equipment licensing is monitored
in this command.
5. Tool Control is taken seriously at my command.
6. My command recognizes individual safety
achievement through rewards and incentives.
7. Unprofessional behavior is not tolerated in the
maintenance department.
8. My command has a problem with passdown
between shifts.
9. My command follows established standards
and maintains quality control.
10. CDIs/QARs are sought after positions in my
command.
1 1. My command temporarily restricts maintainers
who are having personal problems.
12. Based upon my command's current manning
and assets, it is over-committed.
13. My command ensures all maintainers are responsible
and accountable for safe maintenance.
14. My command ensures the uniform enforcement
of SOPs among unit maintenance personnel.
15. Within my unit, good communication flow
exists up and down the chain of command.
16. Coordination is conducted between M/C , W/C
and QA prior to incorporation of TDs.
17. Inspectors perform all required actions before
sign off.
18. Supervisors encourage reporting safety concerns
without fear of retribution.
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1 9. Supervisors discourage violations of SOPs,
or NAMP guidelines.




Supervisors manage the hazards associated with
maintenance and flight line operations.
22. Supervisors are more concerned with mission
completion than aircraft maintenance.
23. My division CPO is aware of individual
daily workload requirements.
24. Unsafe conditions are recognized and
addressed by M/C, Q/A, or W/C supervisors.
25. Supervisors communicate command safety goals,
programs and procedures.
26. Supervisors are actively involved in the safety
program and management of safety matters.
27. Supervisors set the example for compliance to
established maintenance standards.
28. Supervisors are responsive to unexpected changes
and anticipate potential hazards.
29. W/C supervisors are respected by the maintenance
chief/officer.
30. All maintenance evolutions are properly supervised
by qualified personnel.
31 Work center supervisors
,
division CPOs and
M/C work well together.
32. Aircraft moves are briefed and detailed personnel
are qualified.
33. Maintainers are briefed on potential hazards
associated with maintenance activities.
34. My supervisor shields me from outside
pressures which may affect my work.
35. QARs are never pressured by the maintenance
supervisors to sign off a gripe.
36. My MO/MCPO understand if I feel uncomfortable
performing maintenance due to personal issues.
37. Maintainer staffing is sufficient from shift to shift.
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38. Maintenance control is effective in managing
all maintenance activities.
39. Multiple job assignments and collateral duties
adversely affect maintenance.
40. Personnel turnover negatively affects my
command's ability to operate safely.
4 1
.
Violations of SOP, NAMP guidelines, or other
procedures are common in my command.
42. Proper tools and equipment are available,
serviceable and used.
43. Maintenance Control never troubleshoots
aircraft discrepancies.
44. Required publications are available, current,
and used.
45. Maintenance gripes are either corrected or
addressed prior to flight.
46. CDIs/QARs routinely monitor maintenance
evolutions.
47. My command has a reputation for quality maintenance.
48. The QA division is respected in my command.
49. Signing off PQS/JQRs/PARs is taken seriously
and not gun decked.
50. Maintenance quality on detachments is the same ( )
as that in homeport.
5 1 Day and Night Check have equal workload and
are equally stressful/fatiguing.
52. QARs are viewed as helpful, and QA is
not "feared" in my command.
53. Peer influence discourages violations of SOP,
NAMP guidelines or other procedures.
54. Personnel are uncomfortable telling supervisors
about personal problems including illness.
55. I am provided adequate resources (time, personnel
and equipment) to accomplish my job.
56. In my command, we believe safety is an integral
part of all maintenance and flight line operations.
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57. I feel I get all information (internal and external)
required to perform my job safely.
58. Individuals feel free to report safety violations,
unsafe performance, or other unsafe behavior.
59. My command uses safety staff to manage
personnel at risk.
60. Our command climate promotes safe maintenance
and flight operations.
61. Safety decisions are made at the proper
command levels.
62. Safety is part of maintenance planning, and
additional training/support is provided as needed.
63. Maintainers are never purposely put in an
unsafe situation to meet the flight schedule.
64. Safety education and training in my command are
comprehensive and effective.
65. The safety department is respected by
supervisors and maintainers.
66. Maintenance Safety Petty Officer is a sought after
billet in my command.
67. The command uses medical staff to manage
occupational hazards and personnel at risk.
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Total Avg StdDev Total Avg StdDev Total Avg StdDev Total Avg StdDev
1 108 4.45 0.702 93 4.45 0.634 67 4.39 0.758 268 4.44 0.692
2 108 3.86 0.942 93 3.90 0.835 67 3.72 1.070 268 3.84 0.940
3 107 4.44 0.881 92 4.29 0.749 66 4.27 0.755 265 4.35 0.849
4 106 4.39 0.952 92 4.36 0.764 67 4.24 0.836 265 4.34 0.936
5 106 4.54 0.864 93 4.86 0.406 67 4.61 0.673 266 4.67 0.803
46 105 4.24 1.020 90 4.18 0.680 65 4.20 0.775 260 4.21 0.960
59 104 3.92 1.050 90 3.91 0.802 67 3.73 1.109 261 3.87 1.088
67 105 3.30 1.050 91 3.49 1.004 66 3.08 1.154 262 3.31 1.119









Total Avq StdDev Total Avq StdDev Total Avg StdDev Total Avg StdDev
6 106 3.60 0.976 93 3.83 3.828 67 3.90 1.103 266 3.78 1.120
7 105 3.97 1.222 92 4.14 0.859 67 3.87 1.100 264 3.99 1.115
18 107 4.27 0.960 93 4.22 0.845 67 4.01 1.007 267 4.17 0.968
19 105 3.40 1.350 92 4.11 0.883 66 4.03 0.960 263 3.85 1.216
36 101 3.38 1.120 89 3.28 0.988 64 3.17 1.121 254 3.28 1.187
41 105 2.45 1.180 93 2.11 1.098 66 1.94 1.006 264 2.16 1.145
53 105 3.68 1.090 92 3.62 0.959 66 3.53 1.099 263 3.61 1.107
54 105 2.64 1.220 91 2.49 1.109 65 2.91 1.169 261 2.68 1.202
58 105 4.23 0.990 92 4.35 0.702 66 4.05 1.143 263 4.21 1.044
60 105 4.38 0.810 92 4.42 0.683 67 4.28 0.901 264 4.36 0.914









Total Avg StdDev Total Avg StdDev Total Avg StdDev Total Avg StdDev
9 107 4.25 0.814 93 4.30 0.672 66 4.36 0.572 266 4.31 0.756
10 103 3.70 1.027 92 3.73 0.800 65 3.75 0.936 260 3.73 1.048
17 106 4.30 0.790 92 4.22 0.836 67 4.24 0.854 265 4.25 0.898
20 106 1.99 1.190 92 1.82 1.016 66 2.02 1.143 264 1.94 1.128
37 101 2.70 1.160 91 3.16 0.981 67 2.79 1.122 259 2.89 1.186
42 105 3.54 1.300 90 3.89 0.965 66 3.89 1.111 261 3.78 1.215
44 107 4.21 0.990 89 4.33 0.750 66 4.32 0.914 262 4.28 0.930
45 103 4.32 1.030 91 4.34 0.749 66 4.35 0.850 260 4.34 1.063
47 106 4.41 0.880 92 4.51 0.703 66 4.62 0.576 264 4.51 0.847
48 105 4.03 1.140 92 4.34 0.745 66 4.29 0.855 263 4.22 1.047
49 103 3.84 1.230 91 4.01 0.960 66 3.88 1.060 260 3.91 1.212











Total Avg StdDev Total Avg StdDev Total Avg StdDev Total Avg StdDev
11 103 3.04 1.056 91 3.19 0.918 65 3.28 0.875 259 3.17 1.050
12 105 2.93 1.120 92 3.15 0.983 66 3.00 1.123 263 3.03 1.116
21 106 3.94 1.000 92 3.89 0.805 66 3.98 0.903 264 3.94 0.969
22 107 2.32 1.290 92 2.03 0.966 66 2.15 1.056 265 2.17 1.135
23 105 3.80 1.100 90 3.73 0.981 63 3.65 1.109 258 3.73 1.125
24 107 4.33 0.760 92 4.30 0.752 66 4.21 0.814 265 4.28 0.813
40 105 2.92 1.270 91 2.93 0.892 66 2.86 1.201 262 2.91 1.165
51 103 2.60 1.220 87 3.21 0.904 66 2.68 1.166 256 2.83 1.189
55 104 3.50 1.150 88 3.81 0.981 67 3.51 1.106 259 3.60 1.167
61 106 4.08 1.020 92 4.24 0.717 67 4.12 0.930 265 4.15 0.964
62 104 4.15 0.930 92 4.27 0.772 67 4.24 0.818 263 4.22 0.986
63 104 3.80 1.190 92 4.07 1.003 66 4.12 0.969 262 3.99 1.174









Tot Avg SD Tot Avg SD Tot Avg SD Tot Avg SD
13 106 4.35 0.829 92 4.33 0.730 67 4.28 0.692 265 4.32 0.843
14 106 3.98 0.976 92 4.03 0.870 66 4.12 0.775 264 4.04 0954
25 106 4.08 0.950 92 4.12 0.782 66 3.98 0.920 264 4.06 0.951
26 106 3.98 1.000 92 4.18 0.662 66 4.05 0.919 264 4.07 0.939
27 107 3.95 0.960 91 4.14 0.754 66 3.97 0.911 264 4.02 0.913
28 106 3.97 0.950 92 4.01 0.791 66 3.88 0.851 264 3.95 0.933
29 107 3.79 1.070 91 3.45 1.213 66 3.83 1.090 264 3.69 1.155
30 106 3.85 1.090 92 4.15 0.725 66 4.08 0.966 264 4.03 1.011
38 105 3.92 1.090 93 3.82 0.988 66 3.77 1.049 264 3.84 1.114
39 104 3.30 1.200 92 3.10 0.973 66 3.36 1.159 262 3.25 1.175
56 106 4.49 0.810 92 4.57 0.599 67 4.61 0.602 265 4.56 0.792
64 105 4.07 0.960 92 4.10 0.757 67 4.12 0.879 264 4.09 0.968
65 104 3.92 1.100 92 4.07 0.823 67 4.01 1.037 263 4.00 1.100
66 102 3.03 1.100 90 3.21 0.966 67 3.10 1.032 259 3.12 1.126









Total Avg StdDev Total Avg StdDev Total Avg StdDev Total Avg StdDev
8 102 2.78 0.953 92 2.38 1.137 67 2.49 1.146 261 2.55 1.237
15 107 3.75 1.222 93 3.51 1.039 67 3.22 1.152 267 3.49 1.175
16 103 3.88 0.953 91 3.65 0.970 67 3.73 0.827 261 3.75 1.055
31 106 3.78 1.100 92 3.60 1.070 66 3.61 1.149 264 3.66 1.141
32 105 4.00 1.050 92 4.40 0.696 66 3.91 1.092 263 4.10 1.060
33 104 3.91 0.980 91 4.07 0.892 65 4.00 0.952 260 3.99 1.053
34 103 2.91 1.010 87 3.21 1.013 64 2.91 1.019 254 3.01 1.092
35 103 3.66 1.230 91 3.53 1.036 66 3.45 1.126 260 3.55 1.228
43 103 2.70 1.210 90 2.41 1.189 66 2.61 1.175 259 2.57 1.236
52 106 3.89 1.080 90 4.08 0.768 66 3.94 0.943 262 3.97 1.006
57 105 3.96 1.050 91 4.13 0.748 67 4.12 1.023 263 4.07 1.035
MOSE Communication / Relationship Component
70
APPENDIX E. SUGGESTED QUESTIONS MODIFICATIONS
9. My command adequately reviews and updates safety practices.
1 . My command follows established standards and maintains quality control.
13. My command ensures all maintainers are responsible and accountable for safe
maintenance.
New question: My command adequately reviews and updates safety practices, follows
established standards and maintains quality control, while ensuring that all maintainers
are responsible and accountable for safe maintenance.
3. My command monitors maintainer qualifications.
4. Support equipment licensing is monitored in this command.
New question: My command monitors maintainer qualifications and support equipment
licensing.
57. I feel I get all information (internal and external) required to perform my job safely.
58. Individuals feel free to report safety violations, unsafe performance, or other unsafe
behavior.
New question: I feel I get all information required to perform my job safely, and feel free
to report safety violations, unsafe performance or other unsafe behavior.
30. All maintenance evolutions are properly supervised by qualified personnel.
33. Maintainers are briefed on potential hazards associated with maintenance activitites
New Question: Qualified personnel properly supervise all maintenance evolutions and
maintainers are briefed on the potential hazards associated with maintenance activities.
42. Proper tools and equipment are available, serviceable and used.
55. I am provided adequate resources (time, personnel, and equipment) to accomplish my
job.
New question: Proper tools and equipment are available, serviceable and used an I am
provided adequate resources (time, personnel) to accomplish my job.
49. Signing off PQS/JQRs/PARs is taken seriously and not gun decked.
50. Maintenance quality on detachments is the same as that in homeport.
New Question: Signing off PQS/JQRs/PARs is taken seriously, not gun decked and
maintenance quality is as high on detachments as it is in homeport.
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2. The command has a dedicated program that targets individual training deficiencies.
14. My command ensures the uniform enforcement of SOPs among maintenance
personnel.
New question: My command has a dedicated program that targets individual training
deficiencies and ensures the uniform enforcement of SOPs among maintenance
personnel.
37. Maintainer staffing is sufficient from shift to shift.
51. Day and night check have equal workload and are equally stressful / fatiguing.
New question: Maintainer staffing is sufficient, is equally worked and is equally stressed
/ fatigued from shift to shift.
16. Coordination is conducted between M/C, W/C, and QA prior to incorporation of TDs.
38. Maintenance control is effective in managing all maintenance activities.
New question: Maintenance control is effective in managing all maintenance activities,
coordinating between M/C, W/C, and QA prior to the incorporations of TDs.
20. To meet operational commitments, supervisors allow cutting corners.
22. Supervisors are more concerned with mission completion than aircraft maintenance.
New question: Supervisors are more concerned with proper aircraft maintenance than
mission completion and do not allow cutting corners to meet operational commitments.
64 Safety education and training in my command are comprehensive and effective.
65. The safety department is respected by supervisors and maintainers.
New question: Safety education and training in my command are comprehensive and
effective and the safety department is respected by the supervisors and maintainers.
52. QARs are viewed as helpful, and QA is not "feared" in my command.
56. In my command, we believe safety is an integral part of all maintenance and flight
line operations.
New question: Safety is an integral part of this command's maintenance planning/flight
line operations, where QARs are helpful and the QA division is not "feared".
19. Supervisors discourage violations of SOPs, or NAMP guidelines.
53. Peer influence discourages violations of SOP, NAMP guidelines or other procedures.
New question: Violations of SOP, NAMP guidelines or other procedures are discouraged
in this command.
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5. Tool control is taken seriously in my command.
47. My command has a reputation for quality maintenance.
New question: My command has a reputation for quality maintenance and tool control is
taken seriously.
18. Supervisors encourage reporting safety concerns without fear of retribution.
21. Supervisors manage the hazards associated with maintenance and flight line
operations.
24. Unsafe conditions are recognized and addressed by M/C, Q/A, or W/C supervisors.
New question: Safety concerns or unsafe hazards associated with maintenance and flight
line operations can be reported without a fear of retribution knowing that the W/C, Q/A,
or M/C supervisors will address and manage them for proper corrections.
11. My command temporarily restricts maintainers who are having personal problems.
36. My MO/MCPO understand if I feel uncomfortable performing maintenance due to
personal issues
67. The command uses medical staff to manage occupational hazards and personnel at
risk.
New question: Medical staff is used to help identify, manage, and temporarily restrict
personnel with personal issues and those who pose a risk to safe maintenance in this
command.
10. CDIs and QARs are sought after positions in my command.
66. Maintenance Safety Petty Officer is a sought after billet in my command.
New question: QARs/ CDIs and Maintenance Safety Petty Officer are sought after
billets in my command.
45. Maintenance gripes are either corrected or addressed prior to flight.
46. CDIs/QARs routinely monitor maintenance evolutions.
48. The QA division is respected in my command.
New question: The QA division is respected and CDIs / QARs routinely monitor
maintenance evolutions ensuring that maintenance gripes are either corrected or
addressed prior to flight.
Question 8:
Current: My command has a problem with passdown between shifts.
New question: My command does not have a problem with passdown between shifts.
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Question 12:
Current: Based upon my command's current manning and assets, it is over-committed.
New question: Based upon my command's current manning and assets, it is not over-
committed.
Question 20
Current: To meet operational commitments, supervisors allow "cutting corners."
New question: Supervisors do not allow "cutting corners" to meet operational
commitments.
Question 22
Current: Supervisors are more concerned with mission completion than aircraft
maintenance.
New question: Supervisors are more concerned with proper aircraft maintenance than
mission completion.
Question 39
Current: Multiple job assignments and collateral duties adversely affect maintenance.
New question: Multiple job assignments and collateral duties do not adversely affect
maintenance.
Question 40
Current: Personnel turnover negatively affects my command's ability to operate safely.
New question: Personnel turnover does not affect my command's ability to operate
safely.
Question 41
Current: Violations of SOP, NAMP guidelines, or procedures are common in my
command.




Current: Personnel are uncomfortable telling supervisors about personal problems
including illness.




APPENDIX F. FINALIZED MCAS
Purpose : The purpose of this survey is to try and gain valuable insight into the maintenance community's
perception concerning aviation mishaps within the Navy and Marine Corps. Your participation and answers
will be used as a guide in the Navy's on-going efforts to lower the aviation mishap rate.
The first fifteen questions, part I, regard biographical data; information particular to yourself. This
information will aid in the analysis of your responses. NO attempts will be made to identify individual
respondents or their organizations.
Part II has 35 questions pertaining to the maintenance community. Please respond to the questions with
the answer that most correctly reflects your honest opinion. Using a #2 pencil, completely darken each
response.
Thank you in advance for your participation!
PLEASE RESPOND TO EACH ITEM.
1. Your rank? ( ) E-l - E-3 ( )E-4 - E-6 ( ) CPO E-7 + ( ) Officer
2. Your community?
VFA ( ) HS ( ) VMFA ( ) VF ( ) HSL( )
VMA ( ) HC ( ) VP ( ) HCS ( ) vx ( )
VR ( ) VQ ( ) VAQ ( ) VAW ( )
isignator? ( LDO, 152X, etc ) ? / NEC3 . Your
4. Are you currently a department head? ( ) Yes ( ) No
5. Your service? ( ) USN ( ) USNR TAR ( ) SELRES ( ) Other
6. Your shift? ( ) DX ( ) NX ( ) MidX ( ) Other
7
.
Total years of service?
8. Total years of Aviation Maintenance experience?
9. A-School graduate? ( ) Yes ( ) No ( ) N/A
11. Education level : ( ) GED ( ) High School ( ) College, #yrs
12. Unit home location? ( )East coast ( )West Coast ( ) Other
12. Your rating? ( ) AD/AM ( ) AE/AT ( ) PR/AME ( ) AO ( ) Other
13. Your age? ( ) 17-20 ( ) 21-25 ( ) 25-30 ( ) 30+
14. Current maintenance qualifications?
( )Safe for Flight ( ) QAR
( ) CDI ( ) Supervisor
( )SPO ( )N /A
15. Duty: ( ) Shore ( ) Sea
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Part II
1 . My command has a dedicated program that ( )
targets individual training deficiencies and ensures
the uniform enforcement of SOPs among maintenance
personnel.
2. My command monitors maintainer qualifications ( )
and support equipment licensing.
3. My command has a reputation for quality ( )
maintenance and tool control is taken seriously.
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
4. Unprofessional behavior is not tolerated in the
maintenance department.
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
5. My command has a problem with passdown
between shifts.
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
6. My command adequately reviews and updates
safety practices, follows established standards and
maintains quality control, ensuring that all maintainers
are responsible and accountable for safe maintenance.
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
7. QARs/ CDIs and Maintenance Safety Petty Officer are
sought after billets in my command.
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
8 . Medical and safety staff are used to help identify, ( )
manage, and temporarily restrict personnel with personal
issues and those who pose a risk to safe maintenance in
this command.
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
9. Based upon my command's current manning
and assets, it is not over-committed.
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
10. Within my unit, good communication flow
exists up and down the chain of command.
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 1. Maintenance control is effective in managing all
maintenance activities, coordinating between M/C,
W/C, and QA prior to the incorporations of TDs.




( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
13. Safety concerns or unsafe hazards associated ( )
with maintenance/flight line operations can be
reported without fear of retribution knowing that the
W/C, Q/A, or M/C supervisors will address and manage
them for proper corrections.
14. Violations of SOP, NAMP guidelines or other ( )
procedures are discouraged in this command.
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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15. Supervisors are more concerned with proper aircraft ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
maintenance than mission completion and do not
allow cutting corners to meet operational commitments.
16. My supervisors are aware of individual ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
daily workload requirements and recognize safety
achievements through rewards and incentives.
17. Supervisors communicate command safety goals, ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
programs and procedures.
18. W/C supervisors are respected by the maintenance ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
chief/officer.
19. Qualified personnel properly supervise all ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
maintenance evolutions and maintainers are
briefed on the potential hazards associated with
maintenance activities.
20. My supervisor shields me from outside ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
pressures which may affect my work.
21. QARs are never pressured by the maintenance ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
supervisors to sign off a gripe.
22. Maintainer staffing is sufficient, is equally worked and ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
is equally stressed / fatigued from shift to shift.
23. Multiple job assignments and collateral duties ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
do not adversely affect maintenance.
24. Personnel turnover does not affect my ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
command's ability to operate safely.
25. Violations of SOP, NAMP guidelines, or other ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
procedures are not common in my command.
26. Proper tools and equipment are available, ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
serviceable and used and I am provided adequate
resources (time, personnel) to accomplish my job.
27. Maintenance Control never troubleshoots ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
aircraft discrepancies.
28. Required publications are available, current, ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
and used.
29. The QA division is respected and CDIs / QARs ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
routinely monitor maintenance evolutions ensuring
that maintenance gripes are either corrected or
addressed prior to flight.
30. Signing off PQS/JQRs/PARs is taken seriously, ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
not gun decked and maintenance quality is as high
on detachments as it is in homeport.
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31. Safety is an integral part of this command's ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
maintenance planning/flight line operations, where
QARs are helpful and the QA division is not "feared".
32. Personnel are comfortable telling supervisors ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
about personal problems including illness.
33. I feel I get all information (internal and external) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
required to perform my job safely, and feel free to
report safety violations, unsafe performance or other
unsafe behavior.
34. Maintainers are never purposely put in an ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
unsafe situation to meet the flight schedule.
35 Safety education and training in my command are ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
comprehensive and effective and the safety department
is respected by the supervisors and maintainers.
80
LIST OF REFERENCES
Bond, N. A., & Bryan, G. L., & Rigney, J. W., & Warren, H. D. ( 1975 ). Aviation
Psychology . University of Southern California.
Ciavarelli, A., Dr. (Nov 1997). Organizational Safety Effectiveness Model. [On-line].
Available: http://vislab-www.nps.navy.mil/~avsafety/research/qmbmodel.htm
Ciavarelli, A., Dr., & Figlock, R., (Nov 1997). Organizational Factors in Aviation
Accidents. [On-line]. Available: http://vislab- www.nps.navy.mil/~avsafety
/research/orgsum.htm
Ciavarelli, A., Dr., & Figlock, R., (Nov 1997). Organizational Factors in Aviation
Accidents: Command Safety Assessment. [On-line]. Available:http://vislab-
www.nps.navy.mil /-avsafety /research/qmbrept.htm
Degani, A., & Weiner, E. L. (1994). Philosophy, Policies, Procedures, and Practices: The
Four P's of Flight Deck Operations. In Johnston, N., McDonald, N., & Fuller, R. (Eds.),
Aviation Psychology in Practice . Haunts, England: Avebury Technical.
Department of the Navy, (1997). Flying Safe, Preventing Human Error in Naval Aviation.
( 1 997 , November) . Total Quality Leader, Department of the Navy 19 , 1 -4.
Fink, A., & Kosecoff, J. (1985). How to Conduct Surveys, A Step-By-Step Guide. Sage
Publications.
Grabowski, M. & Roberts, K. (1996). Risk Mitigation in large-scale systems. California
Management Review, 39(4), 1-11.
Libuser, C.B. (1994). Organizational Structure and Risk Mitigation. Unpublished doctoral
dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles, California.
Maddox, M. Testing and Troubleshooting. Human Factors Guide to Aviation
Maintenance , Federal Aviation Administration, Washington, D.C. 1998.
Maddox, M. Facility Design. . Human Factors Guide to Aviation Maintenance , Federal
Aviation Administration, Washington, D.C. 1998.
Marx, D. A., & Graeber, C. (1994). Human Error in Aircraft Maintenance. Aviation
Psychology in Practice. Johnston, McDonald and Fuller. 87-104.
McDonald, N., & Fuller, R. (1994). The Management of Safety on the Airport Ramp.
Aviation Psychology in Practice. Johnston, McDonald and Fuller. 68-86.
81
Microsoft Excel, (Computer Software). 1985-1996. Microsoft Corporation.
Naval Safety Center Aviation Safety Review Checklist , Volume V - Maintenance, June
1997 Revision.
Nutwell, Robert & Sherman, K. (1997, March-April). Safety: Changing the Way We
Operate. Naval Aviation News , 12-15.
OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3750.60. The Naval Aviation Safety Program. Department of
the Navy, 1989.
Pidgeon, N., & O'leary, M. (1994). Organizational Safety Culture: Implications for
Aviation Practice. Aviation Psychology in Practice. Johnston, McDonald and Fuller. 21-
41.
Perrow, (1986). Normal Accidents . Basic Book, New York, NY.
Reason, J. (1990). Human Error. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Reason, J.& Maddox, M. Human Error. Human Factors Guide to Aviation Maintenance
,
Federal Aviation Administration, Washington, D.C. 1998.
Ribak, J., Cline, B. (1995). Ground Accidents. Occupational Health in Aviation:
Maintenance and Support Personnel, (pp. 201-205). Academic Press.
Robert, K.H.,(1990) Some characteristics of one type of high reliability organizations^
Organization Science, 1(2) , 160-176.
Schmidt, J. K. Interview (July, 1998). School of Aviation Safety, Naval Postgraduate
School, Monterey, CA.
S-PLUS. Version 4.0, release 3. (Computer software). 1988-1997. Mathsoft Inc.
Zohar, D. (1980). Safety Climate in Industrial Organizations: Theoretical and Applied





Defense Technical Information Center
8725 John J. Kingman Rd., Ste 0944
Ft. Belvoir, VA 22060-6218




3. Director, Training and Education
MCCDC, Code C46
1019 Elliot Rd.
Quantico, VA 22134 - 5027
4. Director, Marine Corps Research Center
MCCDC, Code C40RC
2040 Broadway Street
Quantico, VA 22134 - 5107
5. Director, Studies and Analysis Division .
MCCDC, Code C45
3300 Russell Road
Quantico, VA 22134 - 5130
6. Marine Corps Representative .
Naval Postgraduate School
Code 037, Bldg. 234, HA-220
699 Dyer Road
Monterey, CA 93940
Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support Activity
Technical Advisory Branch
Attn: Maj J.C. Cummiskey
Box 555171
Camp Pendleton, CA 92055-5080
Professor Robert R. Read, Code OR/Re




9. CDR John K. Schmidt
School of Aviation Safety
Naval Postgraduate School
Monerey,CA 93943
10. Professor Lyn R. Whitaker, Code OR/Wh
Department of Operations Research
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943
11. CAPT Robert H. Baker
P.O.Box 153
North Norwich, NY 13814
84

15 «•« 33401
10/99 22527-200 *«
I




